T. E Lawrence and Zionism

<plain_text><page sequence="1">T. E. Lawrence and Zionism CECIL BLOOM 'His relationship to the Zionist movement was a very positive one, in spite of the fact that he was strongly pro-Arab and he has been mistakenly been represented as anti-Zionist. It was his view . . . that the Jews would be of great help to the Arabs and that the Arab world stood to gain much from a Jewish homeland in Palestine.'1 In the light of the history of the period, this statement by Chaim Weizmann, the Zionist leader and first president of the state of Israel, about T. E. Lawrence, known as Lawrence of Arabia, is believed to be a fair description of Lawrence's position in Arab-Zionist his? tory and the objective of this paper is to present the supporting evidence for that contention. Lawrence was so anxious to identify himself as a friend of the Arabian people during his so-called Arab period that he regularly wore traditional Arab costume ? on one occasion he appeared before King George V in this dress ? so Weizmann's words may come as a surprise. But the record shows that Lawrence demonstrated his sympathies for Zionism on a number of occasions. He visited the Weizmann home from time to time and the two men enjoyed, in Weizmann's words, 'a lasting friend? ship'.2 Lawrence certainly admired Weizmann. He once drafted a letter (which he never sent) to the Anglican bishop of Jerusalem which stated that Weizmann 'is a great man whose boots neither you nor I, my dear Bishop, are fit to black'.3 This was intended to be a response to the bishop's plea that Lawrence deny a statement which the bishop said Lawrence had made to Weizmann in 1919. Many books have been written covering Lawrence's military activities in support of the Arab revolt against their Turkish rulers and his advocacy of the Arab cause following the Turkish defeat in the First World War. Much later, during the Second World War, Lawrence was seen by many in Arab countries as the man who had brought them freedom and independence from the Turks and was put on a par with Hitler as one to be admired.4 However, some contemporary Arab writers now regard him * This is an expanded version of a paper presented to the Leeds branch of the Society on 7 October 2002. 1 C. Weizmann, Trial and Error (London 1949) 294-5. 2 A. W. Lawrence (ed.) Lawrence by His Friends (London 1937) 183. 3 D. Garnett (ed.) The Letters ofT. E. Lawrence (London 1938) 343. 4 H. M. Sachar, Europe Leaves the Middle East, igj6-igs4 (London 1974) 159. 125</page><page sequence="2">Cecil Bloom as a 'supporter of Zionist designs in Palestine'.5 In recent years books have been written from an anti-Zionist standpoint which label him as a Zionist sympathizer. Thomas Edward Lawrence was born in 1888, left Oxford with a first-class degree in history and worked as an archaeologist, taking part in a War Office survey of the Negev and Sinai in 1913-14. After the outbreak of war in 1914 he was commissioned in the British Army and posted to the Military Intelligence Office in Cairo. In 1916 he joined the newly formed Arab Bureau in Cairo which was set up to exploit Arab ambitions in the hope that these would help British war aims. A few months later he was appointed liai? son officer to Emir Feisal, son of Hussein, Grand Sherif of Mecca, the leader of the Arab revolt against Turkey. He helped direct Arab military operations that led to the capture of Aqaba in 1917 and to the entry into Damascus in 1918. As Feisal's senior advisor at the Paris Peace Conference his position in Feisal's diplomatic team was unique and authoritative; unquestionably he was a powerful influence on the Arab prince. While in his service he was responsible for the English drafting of many of Feisal's statements and speeches. Later, as a diplomat in the Colonial Office, he also participated in the 1921 Cairo Conference which recommended Feisal as king of Iraq and his brother Abdullah as Transjordan ruler. The British Government encouraged the Arabs both as a means of help? ing to defeat the Turks in the First World War and in the hope of gaining a stronger foothold in the Middle East. As is well known, Lawrence played an important part in the Arab revolt but, contrary to common belief, he did not command the Arab forces; he was Feisal's advisor on matters military and political officer and his services were offered to Feisal with the object of influencing him and ensuring the success of British policy. Lawrence's main purpose in the years following 1917 was to help retrieve British for? tunes in the Middle East, and the intention appears to have been that Britain would help create a new Arab state which, it was believed, would benefit British strategy and would free the Arabs from Turkish domination. Lawrence had strong hostility towards the French and was vocal in his anti French sentiments. He was vigorously opposed to French claims in Syria following the Sykes-Picot agreement. Besides an intelligence report on Syria, he was vehement in an attack on francophile Beirut, which he said was a sewer through which 'shop-soiled foreign influences flow into Syria'.6 One of his postwar objectives was to try and arrange for Jewry to finance Feisal and perhaps all Arabia7 which, it was conjectured, would upset the French position in the Middle East. 5 Umar F. Abd-Allah, The Islamic Struggle in Syria (Berkeley, 1983) 38. 6 L. James, The Golden Warrior (London 1990) 96. 7 P. Knightley and C. Simpson, The Secret Lives of Lawrence of Arabia (London 1969) 4-5. I2?</page><page sequence="3">T. E. Lawrence and Zionism In July 1922 Lawrence suddenly withdrew from public life. He changed his name to John Hume Ross and joined the Royal Air Force a month later as a lowly aircraftman. Unfortunately for him, the Daily Express discovered his whereabouts and published the story, with the result that he was dis? charged from the Force. He then re-enlisted in the Royal Tank Corps, but two years later was allowed to return to the RAF. He again changed his name ? to T. E. Shaw ? and remained in the RAF as a mechanic until short? ly before his death in a crash on his motorcycle in 1935. His reasons for a sudden departure from public life and enlistment in the ranks are difficult to assess. He certainly became disillusioned because of the way the Arabs were being treated and he repeatedly suffered moods of despair as his close relationship with Arabia paled, but his motives for his actions are still not fully understood. Lawrence's role in the Arab revolt continues to this day to be the subject of debate, especially about the contradictory nature of some of his own statements relating to his role among the Arabs. Accusations have been made that he did not have any deep emotional attachment to the Arabs. He is said to have believed that it was in Britain's interests to keep the Middle East divided and that he knowingly deceived the Arabs into believing that the British government was in favour of Arab independence following their liberation from Turkish rule.8 This, however, is not a fair evaluation of Lawrence's involvement. At one point he said he was 'deflated and dishon? oured' by British failures to keep their promises to the Arabs, and yet, in a preface to an abridged version of the Seven Pillars of Wisdom which was never published, he expressed his conviction that 'England is out of the Arab affair with clean hands', adding that although some Arabs rejected his judgement, he had 'worked sincerely on their side. They found me out-of date: and I was happy to withdraw from a political milieu which had never been congenial.'9 But earlier than this, the introduction he wrote for the original edition of The Seven Pillars of Wisdom implied that, while he had hoped to assist the Arabs in their quest for independence, he had been involved in a British conspiracy against them. In this introduction he wrote: 'The Cabinet raised the Arabs to fight for us by definite promises of self government afterwards . . . They [the Arabs] saw in me a free agent of the British Government, and demanded from me an endorsement of its written promises. So I had to join the conspiracy . . . they grew accustomed to believing me and to think my Government, like myself sincere... instead of being proud of what we did together, I was continually and bitterly 8 Ibid. 4, 53. 9 Esco Foundation, Palestine. A Study of Jewish, Arab and British Policies I (New Haven, Conn. 1947) 202. 127</page><page sequence="4">Cecil Bloom ashamed.'10 He also wrote once that he had 'prostituted' himself in Arab service,11 but the conclusion must be that he did support many of the Arab aspirations and tried to balance these against his own Government's aims. It was surely the conflict within the man that led to his withdrawal from pub? lic life. Lawrence was a highly complex character, a maverick and an eccentric maverick, but a genius. Winston Churchill wrote that he had 'the full meas? ure of the versatility of genius' in that he 'held one of the master keys which unlock the doors of many kinds of treasure houses';12 while to Lloyd George he was a 'most elusive and unassessable personality with a mystery that always surrounded him'.13 But there were others who were disparag? ing. He had literary talent and his book on the Arab revolt, Seven Pillars of Wisdom, has gained recognition as a great work of literature. As the great motivator of the revolt against the Turks, Lawrence performed many dar? ing exploits with the Arab fighters, although, curiously, King Abdullah of Jordan wrote that the Arab army in general disliked him when he came to them in March 1917 to help supervise the wrecking of the Turkish rail? way.14 The king, however, is also on record as observing that he rendered the greatest service to the Arabs,15 although after reading Seven Pillars of Wisdom he called him 'a liar and charlatan'.16 Lawrence came to believe that Jewish and Arab interests were not mutu? ally exclusive and that Zionism and Arab nationalism could complement each other while coexisting in the Middle East. He had some ambivalence, however, on the Balfour Declaration, which specified that the British gov? ernment favoured the establishment of a national home for the Jewish peo? ple in Palestine and would endeavour to help achieve this, but his views on its desirability changed. In December 1917 he told Richard Meinertzhagen, Allenby's pro-Zionist (but not Jewish) Political Officer for Occupied Territories in the Middle East, that he saw Palestine being a self-governing province under Arab sovereignty,17 but he had written some three months earlier to Mark Sykes, then a diplomat in Cairo, in a manner that suggested that he accepted the concept of a Zionist state. He told Sykes that Feisal had agreed 'not to operate or agitate west of the [Wadi] Araba - Dead Sea - 10 T. E. Lawrence, Oriental Assembly (London 1939) 144-5. Lawrence, however, decided to suppress this introduction, which was published by his brother only in 1939 four years after his death. This suppression was said to be 'for political reasons'. 11 Knightley and Simpson (see n. 7) 156. 12 W. S. Churchill, Great Contemporaries (London 1949) 193 13 D. Lloyd-George, Memoirs of the Peace Conference (New Haven, Conn. 1939) 666. 14 P. P. Graves (ed.) Memoirs of King Abdullah of Jordan (London 1950) 170. 15 Ibid. 171. 16 Jerusalem Post, 7 February 1954. 17 R. Meinertzhagen, Middle East Diary, 1917-1956 (London 1959) 29-30. 128</page><page sequence="5">T. E. Lawrence and Zionism Jordan line or south of the Haifa - Beisan line', that he was ready to cooper? ate with Arabic-speaking 'Palestinian Jews' and that he wanted to contact what he called the 'colonist Jews' to find out what had been promised them. He added: 'Now Feisal wants to know what is the arrangement standing between the colonist Jews (called Zionists sometimes) and the Allies. In South Palestine the importance is for the future only - but as regards Galilee for the immediate present. What have you promised the Zionists and what is their programme?' He went on: 'You know I'm strongly pro British and also pro-Arab. France takes third place with me: but I quite recognise that we may have to sell our small friends to pay for our big friends, or sell our future security in the Near East to pay for our present victory in Flanders. If you will tell me what we have to give the Jews and what we have to give the French, I'll do everything I can to make it easy for us. Feisal is as reasonable as a soon-to-be successful man can be and now is the time to mould him to our wishes.'18 One extra, although separate, point of interest was that he told Sykes that any information given to Feisal should come from Lawrence himself since 'I usually like to make up my mind before he [i.e.Feisal] does.' The Balfour Declaration came to be viewed by Lawrence as a means of eliminating French influence in Syria by fashioning an Arab-Syrian state under British protection which would be financed by the Zionists.19 His uncertainty about the Declaration continued: in ioiq he spoke of Britain's 'unwise and foolhardy' pledge towards Zionism, because it jeopardized her alliance with the Arabs.20 Notwithstanding this doubt, he took it on himself to convince Feisal and his father that Jewish settlement would benefit the Arabs, and he followed up his letter to Sykes with one to his intelligence chief, Colonel Gilbert Clayton, who had set up the Arab Bureau. D. G. Hogarth, a distinguished Oxford scholar, was an influence on Lawrence both at Oxford and at the Arab Bureau. Hogarth believed a financial deal with the Arabs, possibly financed by the Zionists, would temper their con? cerns about the British attitude to Zionism in the wake of the Balfour Declaration, and convinced Lawrence and Clayton of this. Clayton urged Lawrence to impress on Feisal 'the necessity of an entente with the 18 J. Wilson, Lawrence of Arabia (London 1989) 442-5. A report in The Times (28 February 1976, 12) claimed that this letter had only just been discovered many years after it had been written. Lawrence had sent it to Clayton for onward transmission to Sykes, but Wilson states that Clayton had decided not to pass it on. The Times report indicated that the letter had come into the possession of Abraham Rosenthal, a writer who was said to be a specialist in Gentile attitudes towards Jews, but the circumstances of its coming into his possession were not given. 19 Knightley and Simpson (see n. 7) 108. 20 James (see n. 6) 232. 129</page><page sequence="6">Cecil Bloom Zionists',21 and Lawrence told him: Til talk to him and the Arab attitude shall be sympathetic [to the Jews] for the duration of the war at least. Only please remember that he is under the old man [King Hussein] and cannot involve the Arab kingdom by himself. If we get Madeba, he will come to Jerusalem and all the Jews there will report him friendly. That will proba? bly do all you need without public commitment which is rather beyond my province.'22 Lawrence did have some sentiments which may have conditioned his uncertainties about the Balfour Declaration. He disliked Eastern European and German Jews, whom he called disagreeable, arrogant and dishonest and ignorant adventurers, although Western European and American Jews did appeal to him because they were 'broad minded and liberal'.23 One assumes he placed Weizmann in the latter category. This was not the only indication of anti-Semitism on Lawrence's part. Aaron Aaronsohn was a Jewish settler in Palestine who headed an anti-Turkish intelligence network (the NILI organization) there and he fed his information to Lawrence. Aaronsohn wrote in his diary that when he listened to Lawrence he could almost imag? ine he was 'attending a conference by a scientific anti-Semitic Prussian speaking English'.24 He concluded that Lawrence was hostile to Jewish set? tlers in Palestine. Nevertheless, Lawrence has been accused of showing 'uncommon zeal' in persuading Feisal to do a deal with the Zionists25 and it was his influence with Feisal that resulted in Feisal and Weizmann meeting in Aqaba in June 1918. Lawrence had his own plans for the Middle East, in which he envis? aged the Zionists playing a major role. He and other British diplomats, including Mark Sykes and William Ormsby-Gore, believed that Zionist and Arab interests could be brought together to achieve a progressive polit? ical and economic development of the Middle East.26 The British govern? ment was anxious to reach an accommodation with Feisal which would enable it to bring Palestine and its northern Syrian neighbour under its influence,27 and Lawrence fully supported this. Feisal and Weizmann dis? cussed the need for Arab - Jewish cooperation and, according to Weizmann, Feisal welcomed his proposals for Zionist assistance in advancing towards Damascus and in helping him (Feisal) in international political circles. In 21 A. L. Tibawi, 'T. E. Lawrence, Feisal and Weizmann: the 1919 attempt to secure an Arab Balfour Declaration' Royal Central Asian JournalrLVI (2) June 1969, 157. 22 Public Records Office, Kew, Document FO882/7. 23 James (see n. 6) 232.. 24 A. Verrier (ed.) Agents of Empire (London 1995) 289. Part 3 of this book contains Aaronsohn's diary from December 1916 to January 1919. 25 G. Antonius, The Arab Awakening (Beirut 1969) 284. 26 J. E. Mack, A Prince of Our Disorder (Boston and Toronto 1976) 261. 27 Antonius (see n. 25) 282-3. 130</page><page sequence="7">T. E. Lawrence and Zionism the talks between the two men Lawrence was the moderator and inter? preter, and with his help and encouragement Weizmann made some practi? cal suggestions on how the Zionist movement could provide finance to help consolidate the Arab kingdom. As for the Arabs, they were expected to rec? ognize fully Zionist aspirations in Palestine.28 On 29 October 1918 Lawrence addressed the Eastern Committee of the War Cabinet and told its members that Feisal would choose his own advis? ers, but that he would prefer British and American Zionist Jews to help him provided it was agreed that he (Feisal) would rule Syria while Palestine would be under British control.29 He reported that, while the Arabs did not approve of a Jewish independent Palestine, they would support infiltration of Jews into the country behind a British but not an international facade. If any attempt were made to set up the international control proposed in the Sykes-Picot agreement, Feisal would press for self-determination in Palestine and give the moral support of the Arab government to the peas? antry of Palestine to resist expropriation.30 Meinertzhagen advised Weizmann to go all out for Jewish sovereignty in Palestine. Feisal must have changed his stance because Lawrence said Feisal would support this.31 Later, at the Peace Conference in Paris, Lawrence persuaded the British Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour that Jews and Arabs, despite all the improbabilities, would work together to form a 'solid framework of a para disium in the Near East'.32 Further steps were taken to bring Feisal and Weizmann together again, and they had two more meetings in December 1918 and January 1919 when an agreement called the 'Weizmann-Feisal Agreement' was reached. In addition to Lawrence, Feisal's aides included Nuri Said, Rustum Haidar and Auni Abdul-Hadi,33 men who later became important figures in the Arab nationalist movement. But according to Weizmann Lawrence was the intermediary who negotiated and actually contributed to the drafts of the agreement34 which brought them to a complete understanding.35 One of its key points was that 'all necessary measures shall be taken to encourage and 28 D. Barzilay and B. Litvinoff (eds) The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann VIII (Jerusalem 1977) 207. 29 Public Records Office, Kew, Document CAB 27/24. 30 Garnett (see n. 3) 269. 31 Meinertzhagen (see n. 17) 15. 32 J. E. Villars, T. E. Lawrence or the Search for the Absolute (London 1958) 259. 33 M. Perlman, 'Chapters of Arab-Jewish Diplomacy' Jewish Social Studies VI (2) April 1944,141. 34 Palestine Royal Commission, Command Paper 5479, Colonial No. 134. Minutes of Evidence Heard at Public Sessions (London 1937) 37. Evidence given on 25 November 1936. 35 Weizmann (see n. 1) 294. i3i</page><page sequence="8">Cecil Bloom stimulate immigration of Jews into Palestine on a large scale and as quickly as possible to settle immigrants upon the land through closer settlement and intensive cultivation of the soil.' Arab peasants and tenant farmers would have their rights protected and the Zionist organization agreed to 'send to Palestine a Commission of Experts to make a survey of the econom? ic possibilities of the country and to report upon the best means for its development.' Feisal did, however, add an important proviso (which later gave rise to much controversy) that if Britain reneged on its promise of Arab independence, he would not be bound by a 'single word' of the Agreement.36 In these negotiations, Lawrence as a key player had impressed on Feisal the potential value of Jewish capital and skills in the Middle East. Feisal seemed to show genuine regard for Jewry in general because, at the first of these two meetings, he told Weizmann he could not understand why there was any friction between Arabs and Jews in Palestine when there was no conflict between them in any other country in which the two races were living side by side.37 Feisal actually went much further than this agreement in issuing a posi? tive statement to Reuters news agency which read: The two main branches of the Semitic family, Arabs and Jews, understand one another and I hope that as a result of interchange of ideas at the Peace Conference will be guided by ideals of self-determination, and nationally each nation will make definite progress towards the realisation of its aspirations. Arabs are not jealous of Zionist Jews and intend to give them fair play and the Zionist Jews have assured the nationalist Arabs of their intention to see that they too have fair play in their respective areas. Turkish intrigue in Palestine has raised jealousies between the Jewish colonists and the local peasants but the actual understanding of the aims of Arabs and Jews will at once clear away the last trace of this former bitterness which indeed had already practically disappeared even before the war by the work of the Arab Secret Revolutionary Committee which in Syria and elsewhere laid the foundation of the Arab military successes of the past two years.38 There can be little doubt that Lawrence drafted this statement. Soon after reaching agreement with Weizmann, Feisal was accompanied by Lawrence during discussions with Felix Frankfurter, the leader of the American Zionist delegation at the Peace Conference. The American Zionists were anxious for direct contact with the leading Arab figures at the Conference and Feisal and Frankfurter reached an understanding. Feisal 36 Antonius (see n. 25) 438-9. 37 J. Wilson, Lawrence of Arabia (London 1989) 593. 38 The Times, 12 December 1918, 7. 39 New York Times, 5 March 1919, 7. 132</page><page sequence="9">T. E. Lawrence and Zionism told Frankfurter that it was not intended to restore Jewish civilization in Palestine at the expense of the Arab people and their culture, but he did endorse the aims of the Balfour Declaration. The two men agreed to write to each other to clarify their views and FeisaPs letter to Frankfurter was soon published in the New York Times on 5 March 1919. It said: I want to take the opportunity first to convince American Zionists by telling you what I have often said to Dr Weissmann [sic] in Arabia and Europe. We feel that the Arabs and Jews are cousins in race, have suffered similar oppres? sion at the hands of powers stronger than themselves and by a happy coinci? dence have been able to take the first step toward an attainment of their national ideals together. We Arabs look with the deepest sympathy on the Zionist movement. Our deputation in Paris is fully acquainted with the proposals submitted by the Zionists to the Peace Conference and regards them as moderate and proper. We will do our best to help them through and wish the Jews a most hearty welcome home . . . The Jewish movement is national and not imperialist. . . and there is room in Syria for both of us. Indeed I think neither can be a real success without the other. People less informed and less responsible than our leaders and yours, ignoring the need for cooperation of the Arabs and Zionists, have been trying to exploit the local differences that must necessarily arise in Palestine in the early stages of our movements. Some of them have, I am afraid, misrepresent? ed your aims to the Arab peasantry and our aims to the Jewish peasantry with the result that interested parties have been able to make political capital out of what they call our divisions. I wish to assure you of my firm conviction that these differences are not on questions of principle, but on matters of detail... and may be easily adjusted by mutual goodwill.. . . My people look forward to a future in which we will help you and you will help us.39 The sentiments expressed in this letter go even further than those in the Reuters statement and make clear what Feisal's position seems to have been at this time. Since then, however, both this letter and the Weizmann-Feisal agreement have given rise to some controversy, both being accused of lack? ing authenticity. The authenticity of Feisal's letter to Frankfurter was never questioned when it was first published, but ten years later Arab nationalists claimed it was a forgery and that Lawrence had probably sent it to Frankfurter without Feisal's knowledge.40 At the Shaw Commission hearings which investigated the 1929 Palestine disturbances, when a copy of this letter was produced by Sir Boyd Berriman, the counsel for the 40 S. Mousa, T. E .Lawrence: An Arab View (London, New York and Toronto 1966) 229-30. 41 Minutes of Evidence of Commission on Disturbances in Palestine in 192g, Colonial No. 48 133</page><page sequence="10">Cecil Bloom Zionists, to demonstrate Feisal's goodwill towards Zionism in 1919, an Arab Executive witness, Subhi Al Khada, said he could not believe that Feisal 'would ever write such a letter'.41 The Arab delegation then sent a telegram to King Feisal in Baghdad which read: Tt has been said . . . that in your letter to Mr Frankfurter you consented to the Zionist policy. Please cable to correct this report.'42 A reply was received from Rustum Haidar, by then chief political secretary to Feisal, which said: 'His Majesty does not remember having written anything of that kind with his knowledge'.43 (Haidar, to finish his story, was assassinated in 1940.44) The accusation that the Frankfurter letter was a forgery does not stand scrutiny. On its publication it received wide publicity and expressed senti? ments from Feisal not dissimilar to those given in the statement to Reuters. Its existence was not denied by Feisal or by any of his associates in 1919. It is interesting also that the telegram sent to Feisal in 1929 seemed to imply that there had indeed been a letter. Yet it took the passage of ten years before any objection was made regarding its authenticity. Frankfurter, who said Feisal's letter to him could be treated as one of the basic documents affecting Arab-Jewish relationships in Palestine, then gave an account of his negotiations with Feisal. He said he met Feisal at the latter's villa in the Bois de Boulogne in Paris, with Lawrence as interpreter. They exchanged views and agreed to write letters setting out their respective positions which were to serve as a formal expression of Arab - Jewish views for public announce? ment. It was agreed that Lawrence was to frame in English the substance of Feisal's position. Frankfurter then went back to Lawrence's hotel where they wrote their two letters. Lawrence took his to Feisal who signed it and sent it to Frankfurter.45 It is, of course, possible that Lawrence may have added some words of his own to those intended by Feisal. The fact is that Feisal showed his pro-Zionist sympathies on a number of occasions in the period following the end of the War in 1918. Antonius suggests that he was under much pressure both from Lawrence and the British Foreign Office, but accepts that Feisal was coming round to the view that cooperation with Jews in Palestine was possible.46 Meinertzhagen, writing in 1959, added another facet to this affair when he asserted that the letter was drafted by Feisal together with Weizmann, (London 1929). Evidence given on 30 November 1929. 42 Ibid. Exhibit 125a. 43 Ibid. Exhibit 125b. 44 Perlman (see n. 33) 141. 45 Atlantic Monthly, October 1930, 50. 46 Antonius (see n. 25) 284-5. 47 Meinertzhagen (see n. 17) 15. 48 Weizmann (see n. 1) 307-8. 134</page><page sequence="11">T. E. Lawrence and Zionism Lawrence, Frankfurter and himself.47 Weizmann quoted the letter in his autobiography and commented that this 'remarkable letter', which he claimed expressed Feisal's views and was the culmination of several discus? sions, demolished the criticisms of those who accused the Zionists of plan? ning their activities in Palestine without consulting the 'wishes and welfare of the Arab world'.48 He made no reference, however, to the circumstances in which the letter was composed. Meinertzhagen himself seems not to have commented when the letter's authenticity was challenged at the Shaw Commission hearings, but since there is no confirmation of Meinertzhagen's account from any other source, it must be treated with caution. Arab sources have also claimed that the Weizmann-Feisal agreement did not represent Feisal's views at the time of its publication. In 1936 stories began to circulate that the promise of a Jewish National Home was inconsis? tent with promises made to the Arabs and that Feisal had not reached an entente with Weizmann. It was said that Lawrence had mistranslated the Arabic text of Feisal's caveat making his obligations dependant on the British government's fulfilment of Arab demands and that he had deliber? ately watered it down. Prompted by these accusations, Weizmann wrote an article for The Times in which he referred to the agreement (which he called the Treaty of Friendship) and made it clear that Lawrence had approved the text and had written in his own hand a translation of Feisal's caveat, and that Feisal had signed it.49 Weizmann reported that he possessed the slip of paper that was used to write down this caveat. His statement was challenged in the House of Commons, but his account was supported by the Colonial Secretary, William Ormsby-Gore, who recognized the handwriting on the slip of paper as that of Lawrence, whom he had known well.50 In this debate, Herbert Morrison, the Labour Opposition spokesman, also referred to the agreement which he said had been 'accepted by the Emir Feisal on behalf of the Arabic people'.51 Tibawi has attempted to deal with both the Frankfurter and Weizmann Feisal issues in some depth. He claims Weizmann came to his meeting with Feisal (he does not specify which) with an agreement ready and typed in English and that Feisal's understanding of its terms must have been entire? ly dependant on Lawrence.52 He tries to show that what he claims was Feisal's caveat written in Arabic was not properly translated into English by Lawrence, but it is clear that the differences between the two versions as given by him are not significant. Tibawi does, however, concede that Feisal 49 The Times, iojune 1936, 15. 50 Hansard Parliamentary Debates 5th Series, House of Commons CCCXIII (1935-6) col? umn 1393, 19 June 1936. 51 Ibid, column 1382. 52 Tibawi (see n. 21) 159-62. 135</page><page sequence="12">Cecil Bloom was ready to accept a Zionist programme, albeit one under Arab sovereign? ty. As for the Frankfurter letter, Tibawi examined a facsimile copy of it which was published in the Jerusalem Post in December 1964 and conclud? ed that the signature purporting to be that of Feisal was a forgery because the Arabic letters were 'clumsy and unsure'. He also queried the letter because it appeared to be written on 'specially prepared notepaper'.53 Anthony Nutting, one-time British MP and a leading Arab apologist, also wrote about the Frankfurter letter. He did not suggest that it was a for? gery, but he concluded that 'there was more of Lawrence than Feisal in these magnanimous words'.54 Notwithstanding all this controversy, if the letter was indeed a forgery, it would point even more clearly to Zionist sym? pathies on Lawrence's part. Feisal also made other comments which clearly indicated where he stood at that time and which were complementary to the Reuters and Frankfurter statements. An example is a speech he made at a dinner given in his honour by Lord Rothschild (two months before he sent his Frankfurter letter) in which he said: 'The Arabs are the nearest relations of the Jews and have been their constant friends from Baghdad to Yemen and Cordova - at times when their treatment by European nations was not all that might be desired. No true Arab can be suspicious of Jewish national? ism.' He was sure no Jew wanted to convert his mosque [that is, the Dome of the Rock] to a temple and 'we would show ourselves unworthy if we did not now welcome [Jews]... back home and cooperate with them to the limit of the ability of the Arab state. Dr Weizmann's ideals are ours. . . . [We] are cousins in blood.'55 It is curious that, in comparison with the Frankfurter letter, neither the Reuters statement nor this speech has attracted much attention from historians. Feisal did alter his position somewhat once Lawrence's ties to him weak? ened after he returned to direct government service. Interviewed by a London Jewish Chronicle journalist late in 1919, he was at pains to empha? size that Palestine was the sacred land of the Arabs which must remain an integral part of Syria. He said that Jews settling there must be 'subject to the rights and aspirations and the sentiments of the present possessors of the land'.56 He remained in agreement with Weizmann's proposals, howev? er, which he considered moderate and practical, and he was happy to see Jews settle in Palestine with equal rights. Jews were urged to go to Palestine and cooperate with the native population especially since they 'have the means and we have the numbers'. This interview must have given rise to 53 A. L. Tibawi, Anglo-Arab Relations and the Question of Palestine 1914-1921 (London !977)349 54 A. Nutting, Lawrence of Arabia (New York 1962) 182. 55 Jewish Chronicle, 3 January 1919, 20. 56 Ibid. 3 October 1919, 14-15. 136</page><page sequence="13">T. E. Lawrence and Zionism some concerns in Zionist quarters, because two months later Feisal wrote to Herbert Samuel to dispel them. Writing from Paris, he told Samuel that he was glad to learn that Samuel had chosen the occasion of the second anniversary of the Balfour Declaration to dispel any misunderstanding aris? ing from the Jewish Chronicle interview. T am fully convinced', he wrote, 'that the mutual confidence established between us and the complete agree? ment of our points of view which has made possible a firm understanding between Dr Weizmann and myself will prevent in the future any similar misunderstanding and will maintain between us that harmony so necessary for the success of our common cause.'57 During the 1936 argument on his treaty with Feisal, Weizmann gave the text of this letter to The Times to support his contention that Feisal had concluded a treaty with him.58 What is particularly interesting about Feisal's newspaper interview is that it seems that he considered relatively few Jews (about 1000 to 1500) would settle in Palestine annually, suggesting perhaps that his pro-Zionism was based on a low level of Jewish immigration. There is nothing in Lawrence's record to suggest that he saw Jewish numbers in the same way, although he had, in fact, been known to have been worried about the safety of the Jewish population in the country. In 1921, after it was decided not to form a Palestine Defence Force, he expressed concern about security and minuted the Middle East Committee of the War Cabinet: 'I think the Jewish colonies are at present insufficiently defended . . . the British troops would not do much more than defend themselves and ... a general [Arab] rising against the colonists is possible at no very distant date. . . . The final success of Zionism will end it [the problem of defence of the Jewish population] but this may be fifty years hence.' He advised that the colonists be given the means to defend themselves until British troops could be brought in.59 There was one other occasion when Lawrence was uneasy about the safety of the Jews. He was travelling through Gaza with Churchill and High Commissioner Samuel when they were greeted with shouts of 'Cheers for the Minister and for Great Britain!' But their chief cry was a frenzied 'Down with the Jews. Cut their throats!' Churchill and Samuel, neither of whom understood Arabic, were pleased with their reception, but Lawrence understood clearly what the masses were saying and was 'obviously and gravely anxious about the whole situation'.60 After Lloyd George had convinced his own cabinet and the French that Britain should be given the Mandate for Palestine, Lawrence did show some inconsistency in his thinking. In September 1919 he wrote to a friend 57 The Times, 19 June 1936, 12. 58 Ibid. 59 D. Ingrams (ed.) Palestine Papers igiy-22: Seeds of Conflict (London 1972) 127. 60 Lawrence (see n. 2) 235-6. 137</page><page sequence="14">Cecil Bloom that a British Mandate would mean that the Zionists would have a centre in Jerusalem, adding: 'They will finance the whole East . . . Syria and Mesopotamia alike. High Jews are unwilling to put much cash into Palestine only, since that country offers nothing but a sentimental return. They want 6%.'61 But about the same time, with other Colonial Office advisers, he told Churchill that the economic development of Palestine west of the Jordan had been badly hindered by a reluctance to allow Jewish industrialists to proceed with plans for industrial action until the Mandate was officially given to Britain.62 Lawrence had a great admiration for Weizmann and his reply to the Jerusalem bishop was only one indication of this. Weizmann, for his part, generally appreciated the respect of a man who was happy on occasions to confide in him. Once, for example, Lawrence told him that there were par? ties who were agitating against Jewish interests in Palestine,63 something he would not have said if he had been hostile to the Zionist cause. Weizmann was convinced that Lawrence was himself satisfied that legitimate Arab claims had been met,64 but despite his positive opinions on Lawrence he did have some reservations. He once wrote to his wife, Vera, that Lawrence was 'not very good',65 and on another occasion when Lawrence was on Churchill's staff at the Colonial Office he told her that 'I trust Lawrence very little'.66 The book T. E. Lawrence by his Friends, published after his death, con? tains a large number of tributes and appreciations. Weizmann wrote that before he met Lawrence in June 1918 in Aqaba, just as the attack on the Turkish railway was being planned, he feared he might be hostile to Zionists, and that 'it was therefore a great relief to me to find him not only friendly to the ideals embodied in Zionism but fully conversant with the subject'. He added that Lawrence never regarded the policy of a Jewish National Home as in any way incompatible with assurances given to the Arabs. He did not think the aims and aspirations of the Jewish people in Palestine conflicted with the interests of the Arabs. Weizmann conceded that Lawrence had some doubts on the practicability of Zionist hopes, but when halutzim (Jewish pioneers in Palestine) came in 1920 from Eastern Europe he was impressed by their zeal and industry. A long talk in 1921 convinced him that Lawrence believed that Jewish-Arab cooperation was very important. Lawrence thought that 'Arab redemption was likely to 61 M. Gilbert, Exile and Return (Philadelphia and New York 1978) 123. 62 M. Gilbert, Winston S. ChurchilllV 1916-1922 (London 1975) 538-9. 63 J. Reinharz (ed.) The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann (Jerusalem 1977) 9:130. 64 N. A. Rose (ed.) The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann (Jerusalem 1979) 19:131-2. 65 B. Wasserstein (ed.) The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann (Jerusalem 1977) 10:153. 66 Ibid. 157. i38</page><page sequence="15">T. E. Lawrence and Zionism come about through Jewish redemption' and that close cooperation between the two peoples would be to their mutual advantage.67 Weizmann returned to praise Lawrence in a letter written to the Prime Minister Clement Attlee in 1946. He told him that Lawrence had been one of the Arab protagonists who was a foremost advocate of Jewish settlement in Palestine.68 Most of these comments about Lawrence's views on Zionism and Arab Jewish cooperation are fully compatible with those held by Feisal, but there are a number of other examples which demonstrate his positive attitude towards Zionism. He showed sympathy for Jewish settlers in Palestine long before he became involved in Middle East politics. In 1909 he wrote to his mother that Palestine was a decent country that could quite easily be trans? formed. 'The sooner the Jews farm it all the better, their colonies are bright spots in the desert.'69 Before he joined the Arab Bureau he had made some notes about his prewar survey in Palestine. He referred to 'aboriginal [sic] Palestinian Jews' who successfully cultivated the land and therefore enjoyed better living standards than their Arab neighbours. These Jews were said to 'hide their lights under bushels', but he was contemptuous of what must have been the haredi (ultra-orthodox) community who were 'unable to endure near them anyone not of their race' and whose enemies were the Palestine peasants 'more stupid than the peasants of North Syria, materialist and bankrupt'. He added that the Jewish colonies who probably paid their way were 'honest in their attempts at colonization and deserve honour'.70 Another example of his pro-Zionist feeling came when Abdullah marched into Amman in 1921. Churchill was worried about anti-Zionist activities emanating from Transjordan and was anxious to keep such trou? ble under control, an opinion Lawrence shared. Lawrence, who saw Abdullah as a none-too-powerful leader who would need support from the British government for the retention of his office, argued that allowing Abdullah to become ruler of Transjordan would enable the government to check any anti-Zionist activity he might contemplate. He told Churchill that 'in four or five years under the influence of a just policy, the opposition to Zionism would have decreased if it had not entirely disappeared'. It was preferable to use Transjordan as a safety valve by appointing a ruler on whom pressure could be brought to bear to check anti-Zionism, and oppo? sition to Zionism might eventually disappear.71 William Yale, a member of the King-Crane Commission sent to the Middle East by President 67 Lawrence (see n. 2) 220-4. 68 J. Heller (ed.) The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann (Jerusalem 1979) 22:124. 69 Garnett (see n. 3) 74. 70 M. Brown (ed.) Secret Despatches from Arabia and Other Writings (London 1991) 103-4. 71 Gilbert (see n. 62) 553. 139</page><page sequence="16">Cecil Bloom Woodrow Wilson, supports the view that Lawrence understood the Zionist case and that it was compatible with Arab aspirations. Yale was in favour of a British mandate for Palestine and suggested that Zionist plans for the country should be allowed to go ahead. He received support from Lawrence as well as from Nuri Said and Rustum Haidar. The last two said that Feisal would accept them. Yale recorded that Lawrence 'went over my projected solution and approved of it heartily saying that it gave the Arab more than he could have dared to secure for them'.72 Edwin Samuel, son of Herbert, who served in the Mandatory Government for almost thirty years and was later a lecturer at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, is on record as saying that when Lawrence was in the RAF in the 1930s he asked him why he was being labelled anti-Zionist by some people. Lawrence replied that this was nonsense as he [Lawrence] had invented the slogan 'Arabia for the Arabs, Judea for the Jews and Armenia for the Armenians'. Samuel wrote that Lawrence did not support any Arab claim to Palestine.73 Lawrence once told Lloyd George that Palestine should be 'for England and Jewish home-makers'.74 Another example of Lawrence's views comes from a statement he made on the first anniversary of the Balfour Declaration to a Jewish newspaper: 'Speaking entirely as a non-Jew, I am decidedly in favour of Zionism; indeed I look on the Jew as the natural importers of western leaven so necessary for countries of the Near East.'75 The Zionist organization in Britain also provides support for the thesis that Lawrence had sympathies for Zionism. To mark the cente? nary of his birth it issued a publicity pamphlet aimed at countering the belief that he was anti-Zionist, which included a commendation that Weizmann had written many years earlier. Lewis Namier, the distinguished historian and committed Zionist, also throws light on Lawrence's Zionism. During a conversation with him in July 1930 Lawrence told Namier: 'The problem of Zionism is the problem of the third generation. It is the grandsons of your immigrants who will make it succeed or fail but the odds are so much in its favour that the experiment is worth backing and I back it not because of the Jews but because a regenerated Palestine is going to raise the whole status of its Middle East neighbours.' Namier added that he took these words down in shorthand and then read them back to Lawrence. He also passed on to the Colonial Secretary Malcolm McDonald a comment from Lawrence that he was prepared to testify on behalf of the Zionists to the British cabinet, but this does not appear to have been followed up.76 72 Lawrence (see n. 2) 285-6. 73 E. Samuel, A Lifetime in Jerusalem (London 1970) 48. 74 R. Aldington, Lawrence of Arabia (London 1955) 259. 75 Gilbert (see n. 61) 115. 76 L. B. Namier, In the Margin of History (London 1939) 281-2. 140</page><page sequence="17">T. E. Lawrence and Zionism One final item relates to a pamphlet entitled Lawrence on Palestine, issued by the London Anglo-Palestine Club, a non-party Jewish forum dealing with aspects of Zionism and Palestine; this makes it clear that Lawrence was perceived as a Zionist sympathizer. It begins: 'Lawrence of Arabia was probably the greatest English friend the Arabs ever had. He knew them well, he understood them, he knew what Britain promised them. It is of great interest at the present moment to know that, with regard to Palestine, he was all in favour of Zionism.' The pamphlet quotes a letter Lawrence sent to Robert Graves, the poet and novelist and one-time professor of English at Cairo University, in which he assured Graves that Zionist suc? cess would 'enormously reinforce the material development of Arab Syria and Iraq'.77 As for Lawrence's own written words, in September 1920, in unsigned article entitled 'The Changing East' for The Round Table journal, he said he believed Jewish immigration could benefit the Arab population. He wrote: '[The Jewish experiment] is a conscious effort, on the part of the least European people in Europe, to make head against the drift of the ages, and return once more to the Orient from which they came . . . They propose to settle down among the existing Arab-speaking population of the country, a people of kindred origin, but far different social condition. They hope to adjust their mode of life to the climate of Palestine, and by the exercise of their skill and capital to make it as highly organised as a European state. The success of their scheme will involve inevitably the raising of the pres? ent Arab population to their own material level, only a little after them? selves in point of time and the consequences might be of the highest importance for the future of the Arab world . . . .' He added that Arab eco? nomic and technical success in the future world would largely 'stand or fall by the course of the Zionist effort and by the course of events in Russia'.78 This article clarifies where Lawrence stood (at least in 1920) vis ? vis Jewish settlement in Palestine, but it is significant that he made sure his authorship of the piece was withheld. The source was revealed only when it was repub lished in Oriental Assembly, a collection of his writings and which appeared four years after his death. For several years after he died, Arab commentators were full of praise for Lawrence whom they saw as a great man who worked hard and bravely to promote the Arab cause, and many revered him. Unpublished letters to Lawrence from Feisal after he became king of Iraq (copies of which are held in the British Museum) are said to be filled with expressions of warmth and 77 Library Publications Committee, Anglo-Palestine Club, Lawrence on Palestine (London n.d.). 78 'The Changing East', in The Round Table, September 1920, 769. The article was unsigned, but was republished later in Lawrence (see n. 10) 92-3. 141</page><page sequence="18">Cecil Bloom affection, suggesting no change in Feisal's feelings towards Lawrence after he ceased being his advisor,79 and in one published letter, written much later in December 1932, Feisal offered his 'cordial thanks for the interest you have had in our affairs despite your being at far distance from us'. He praised him as 'a sincere friend . . . who has ever been our valuable support'.80 The king indicated he was hoping to see Lawrence when he visited London the following year. Meinertzhagen, however, recorded that Feisal told him in November 1922 that he had given up faith in Lawrence; Lawrence was a 'humbug', an adventurer and a self-advertiser.81 Meinertzhagen did add that Feisal was ungracious in this criticism of a man who had done so much for him, but such comments, written by Meinertzhagen long afterwards, must be treated with caution. There is no doubt that Lawrence had a high regard for Feisal who, he believed, was 'the most democratic of men' and 'the greatest Arab leader since Saladin'. He pointed out also that when Palestinian Arabs appealed to Feisal for support and help against the Jews he told them that 'Zionism was not incompatible with Arab aspirations'.82 On Lawrence's death, the Iraqi charge d'affaires in London praised him as 'the champion of Arab peace [who] did his utmost in striving for the inde? pendence of our nation'. Lawrence was said to have so promoted the Arab cause both during the War and at the Peace Conference that 'the Arab nation will be deeply grieved at his death because they had lost a great friend'. The Saudi Arabian spokesman in London said he was admired for his courage and fighting qualities. In similar tributes at the same time Field-Marshall Viscount Allenby said he had been the mainspring of the Arab movement and in complete sympathy with his Arab companion (that is, Feisal). The historian Basil Liddell-Hart wrote that he fulfilled brilliantly the purpose of giving the Arabs a fair chance of achieving their own aspirations.83 There can be little doubt of Lawrence's commitment to the Arab cause. Churchill wrote of Lawrence's private audience with George V in 1919 after he had been gazetted for the award of Commander of the Bath (CB). He refused the honour, telling the king that it was impossible for him to accept any honour while Britain was 'about to dishonour the pledges which he had made in her name to the Arabs who had fought so bravely'.84 In the same year he drafted a letter to Lloyd George to thank him for not letting the Arabs down as he had previously thought they would be.85 On his 79 Mack (seen. 26) 501. 80 A. W. Lawrence (ed.), Letters to T. E. Lawrence (London 1962) 56-7. 81 Meinertzhagen (see n. 17) 35. 82 The Times, 11 August 1920, 9. 83 Ibid. 20 May 1935, 15. 84 Lawrence (see n. 2) 193. 85 Garnett (see n. 3) 287. 142</page><page sequence="19">T. E. Lawrence and Zionism death, the official Nazi news agency praised him as a man of 'exemplary devotion to duty, disinterestedness and self-sacrifice and an almost mythi? cal figure among British heroes', but the Nazi propaganda machine changed its stance within four years. A film, Uprising in Damascus, portrayed him as 'the devious agent of British imperialism and Zionism'.86 There is a claim that German Nazis tried to contact him in 1932, but that he rejected their advances. Just before his death the British writer and Nazi sympathizer Henry Williamson unsuccessfully tried to follow this up,87 but Williamson stated categorically that Lawrence had no sympathy for Hitler. The general Arab attitude towards Lawrence and his role in the events of the Middle East from 1917 onwards has now changed, and many Arab com? mentators refer to him as being pro-Zionist. Suleiman Mousa, a distin? guished Arab historian, is highly critical in his book entitled T.E.Lawrence: An Arab View of Lawrence's role in the politics of the Middle East in his time.88 Auni Abdul-Hadi, Feisal's secretary in London and Paris, wrote that Lawrence 'played an important part in helping the Zionists since he viewed Zionism with unmistakable favour in spite of all that has been said about his attachment to the Arabs. He was an Englishman first and fore? most, and always worked for British interests.' He claims that Feisal culti? vated Lawrence's help in defeating the Turks, but that Lawrence exploited Arab needs for his own benefit. Hadi tells of a pro-Arab English lady who held a meeting at her home in 1919 to protest at her government's pro Zionist policy, which Lawrence was said to have declined to attend because he did not believe anti-Zionism served British interests. He claims it was only then that Feisal fully realized Lawrence's true position on Arab Zionist issues.89 But claims that Feisal lost confidence in Lawrence are, however, contradicted by the Feisal letters quoted above. Another writer, Abd-Allah, scorns Lawrence's role in the Arab nationalist movement, describing him as one who was 'in' but hardly 'of Arabia and who was a supporter of'Zionist designs in Palestine'.90 Tibawi attempts to show that Feisal was pressurized primarily by Lawrence into a deal with the Zionists to ensure that the Arabs would endorse the Balfour Declaration. In his Royal Central Asian Journal paper, his last sentence reads: 'Vain, too, were the efforts of Sykes and Lawrence to intimidate and coax the Arabs into acquiescing in the Zionist policy of the British Government'.91 This con? clusion, however, clearly conflicts with a previous section of his paper 86 James (see n. 6) 362. 87 E. Lonrooth, Lawrence of Arabia (London n.d.) 93. 88 Mousa (see n. 40). 89 Ibid. 226-30. 90 Abd-Allah (see n. 5) 38. 91 Tibawi (see n. 21) 163. 143</page><page sequence="20">Cecil Bloom where part of a telegram Feisal sent to Zaid, his brother and deputy in Damascus, is quoted: 'Anti-Zionist articles in your Damascus papers . . . please explain [to the Military Governor in Syria] that the Zionist Committee is helping us very much here in Paris and that I am most anx? ious to retain their goodwill.'92 This telegram was sent following two anti Zionist articles. Tibawi implied without evidence that it had been sent without Feisal's knowledge, but this is untenable. A more recent comment on this subject comes from the writer Michael Yardley who reported that he met Palestine Liberation Organization representatives while he was researching his book Backing into the Limelight and found them 'hostile and bitter' in their opinion of Lawrence. Yardley was also told by the Syrian Ministry of Information that Lawrence had been forgotten and was official? ly regarded as 'an imperialist spy'.93 In a number of ways Lawrence was a mass of contradictions with strong opinions and powerful prejudices. Meinertzhagen, who claimed he knew him better than anyone else, found it difficult to form a firm opinion on a 'very complex and interesting man'.94 He had, of course, shown ambiva? lence in his attitude towards the Balfour Declaration and reserved some of his bitterest comments for the German Jews of the Zionist settlements who were 'the most foreign, most uncharitable parts of the whole population'.95 One curiosity worth mentioning relates to his official biography by Liddell Hart. It was published in 193496 and Lawrence himself cooperated in its writing. Lawrence gave Liddell-Hart much information in the form of let? ters, notes, conversations and answers to questions,97 but there is no men? tion of Zionism, or even the word 'Jew', in the biography. So where does this leave the status of Lawrence in Arab and Zionist history? The Encyclopaedia Judaica''s entry on Lawrence reads: 'For decades Lawrence was a legendary romantic figure and was considered champion of the Arab national cause who had accused the British of betraying their obli? gations to it... There seems no doubt, however, that Lawrence was never an anti-Zionist and that he regarded Zionism and Arab nationalism as comple? mentary forces to each other.'98 The final sentence of that statement proba? bly summarizes accurately his place in the history of modern Palestine. All that he stood for demonstrates his belief in the need to bring the peoples of Arabia into the modern world and to procure self-government for them. He 92 Ibid. 161. 93 M.Yardley, Backing into the Limelight (London 1985) 13. 94 Meinertzhagen (see n. 17)27. 95 James (see n. 6) 96. 96 B. H. Liddell-Hart, T. E. Lawrence: In Arabia and After (London 1934). 97 T. E. Lawrence, To His Biographer (New York 1938). 98 Encyclopaedia Judaica (Jerusalem 1971) 10:1488. 144</page><page sequence="21">T. E. Lawrence and Zionism saw that a Jewish presence in Palestine (but not with complete Jewish auton? omy) could help achieve this and ensure the healthy development of the Arab economy. He was in favour of Jewish settlement west of the Jordan, but perhaps failed to see the inevitability of such Jewish settlement coming into conflict with Arab ideology. What would Lawrence's attitude have been towards Israel? He died in 1935, but he appears not to have made any statements on Arab-Zionist issues after 1930 when he told Namier he was prepared to address the British cabinet in support of Zionism. It is idle to speculate about the atti? tude he would have adopted after 1945 or 1948, just as it is unlikely that the controversy on his eventual relationship with Feisal can be satisfactorily resolved. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT I wish to thank the staff of Atlantic Monthly for providing me with a copy of Felix Frankfurter's account of his negotiations with the Emir Feisal. 145</page></plain_text>