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Anglo-Jewish Causes Célèbres

Norman Bentwich

<plain_text><page sequence="1">Anglo-Jewish Causes Celebres: Leading Cases in the English Courts from the Beginning of the Eighteenth Century THE LADY MAGNUS MEMORIAL LECTURE, By Norman Bentwich, O.B.E., M.C., M.A., Delivered before the Jewish Historical Society of England on lAfh December, 1941. I should like, at the outset, to pay a word of personal tribute to the woman in whose name this lectureship was established. Lady Magnus is one of the bright recollections of my boyhood. I was brought up on her Outlines of Jewish History and Jewish Portraits. And when I was a little older and came to know her personally she encouraged me, as she encouraged any young man or woman with literary interests, to write. She would have revelled herself in these stories of the morals and manners of the past centuries, with their touch of scandal. She would have made the musty records live, because both with her tongue and with her pen she had an unfailing liveliness. The suggestion for this lecture was made by Dr. Roth, who said that it might be interesting to treat from the lawyer's outlook a selection of cases concerning Jews which have been heard in British Courts during the last 250 years and throw light on the develop? ment of the Community. In England, more than in any other country, the fundamental rights of the subject depend on the decisions of the courts rather than on the legislature. The Law 93</page><page sequence="2">94 ANGLO-JEWISH CAUSES CELEBRES Reports, then, reflect the progress of the Jew as citizen. The material was ready to hand in the Law Reports, or in the works of Lucien Wolf, H. S. Q. Henriques, and Dr. Roth, or in pamphlets which have been collected to replace the losses caused by the destruction of the Mocatta Library of the Society. Two classes of cases are to be distinguished; one presents steps in the civil and political emancipation, the other the recognition or rejection in the English Courts of the Jewish Law of family relations and incidents connected therewith, and the relation of Jews to the established religion of the country. As to the first class, it is remark? able how slowly tolerance broadened from precedent to precedent after the first general Act of Tolerance, which goes back to the end of the seventeenth century. But that class of case is left for a separate study; and this lecture deals with the second class. One or two of the marriage cases and the criminal cases are less notable for their legal interest than for the light which they throw on manners and morals of the Jews and others. Generally, these cases of individuals hold up a mirror, as it were, to the Anglo-Jewish society through the centuries. We can see in the mirror the progress from a strange and curious " nation " to a religious community of British subjects, gradually achieving equal civic rights, and then passing to an age which stresses once more the conceptions of race and nationality. But the cases shall speak for themselves. I Validity of Forfeiture Clause in Jewish Wills for Intermarriage with a Gentile In the earliest recorded cases after the Resettlement, Jews were brought into the Courts against their will, because of their action in disinheriting a child who was received into the Christian Church. There was no profession at the beginning of the eighteenth century of equal rights of the different religious communities. Discrimina? tion against non-conformity, whether of Roman Catholic or Puritan</page><page sequence="3">ANGLO-JEWISH CAUSES CELEBRES 95 or Jew, was enshrined in the law. It was felt to be contrary to public policy that a Jew, a member of a tolerated but infidel creed, should penalise a child who adopted the faith of the State. The question came before the Courts at the end of the seventeenth century in connection with an order made by the Justices of the City of London against a Jewish father for the payment of maintenance to his daughter, who had adopted Christianity. The application was made by the inhabitants of the parish of St. Andrews Undershaft?one of the churches destroyed in the Battle of London of 1941?against one Mendes de Brita. The Justices made an order that the father should allow 20s. a month for the maintenance of his child under penalty. They based their order on a Statute of Elizabeth about the duty of a parent to maintain an indigent child. But a motion was made to the King's Bench Court to quash the order on the ground that they had no jurisdiction. It was not alleged that the daughter was poor, or was likely to become chargeable to the Parish. The plea was upheld, and the order was quashed.1 The decision provoked public agitation, petitions were presented to Parliament, and in the first year of the reign of Queen Anne a statute was passed which laid down that if any Jew, in order to induce his Protestant child to change his or her religion, shall refuse to allow such child fitting maintenance, the Court may make an order against him for the maintenance. Under this Statute of 1702 a case was brought in 1718, Vincent v. Fernandez (reported in 1 Peer Williams, p. 524). A petition was presented by a married woman, over forty years of age, claiming maintenance from the estate of her Jewish father, who had died and by will left all his property to charities. It was urged that she came within the terms of the Statute " refusing to give fitting main? tenance It was objected that she could not properly be described as a child, and, moreover, the dead father could not be said " to refuse ". The Court, however, granted the petition. The spirit of the Act was directed to prevent the father disinheriting a child by 1 Reported in Lord Raymond 697. See also Henriques, The Jews and the English Law, pp. 168-69.</page><page sequence="4">96 ANGLO-JEWISH CAUSES CELEBRES will. " The obligation of nature is placed so strongly on behalf of the child that when such a case of disinheritance happens, some great provocation must be supposed to have occasioned it; and if no other cause be made to appear, the difference of religion shall be intended to be the reason. It was possible that the charities given by the Jew were under some secret trust for the child if she turned Jew." The reporter of the case noted that no order was, in fact, made in the petition, these remarks having been made at the hearing; and it was probable that the parties came to a compromise about the disposal of the fortune. The Act itself was repealed in 1846. It is remarkable that, after nearly 250 years, the English Courts have had to deal afresh with the question of the validity of a pro? vision in the will or settlement of a Jew forfeiting the share of a descendant in case of marriage with a person not of the Jewish faith. The contrast between their attitude in the Victorian Age and in the last years is striking. In the earlier period the Court dismissed a question whether a condition of the kind was in accordance with public policy. In the latter it has tended to hold the forfeiture clause invalid as against broad principles of policy.1* II Mixed Marriages and Legitimacy The Goodman Family2 The family affairs of Henry Goodman, who died in 1832, produced a crop of cases in the Courts. Several of his children married Christians, and two lived with Christian women and had families before they were married. Subsequendy they went abroad to countries which permitted legitimation of children by subsequent marriage of the parents. The questions of his inheritance turned on the legitimacy of the children, and the decisions became leading authorities on the conflict of laws. la See note on page 120. 2 See Henriques, Op. cit., p. 42.</page><page sequence="5">ANGLO-JEWISH CAUSES CELEBRES 97 Henry Goodman, by his will in 1801, left his property to trustees to be divided between his seven children during their lifetime, and after their death on trust for their children. One of his daughters was Elizabeth Van Oven, whose husband was to play an important part in Anglo-Jewish charities, but about her share there was no litigation. One of the sons, Isaac Goodman, lived with an English Christian woman for twenty-eight years as man and wife, partly in England and pardy abroad. About his share there was litigation, the question being whether the children of the union should be regarded as legitimate and therefore entided to share in the family inheritance on his death. The case Goodman v. Goodman2, was tried in 1859 before Vice-Chancellor Stuart. Evidence was given that the brothers and sisters of Isaac Goodman never recognised the marriage; and some of them swore that they did not know of the reputation of marriage. Isaac, in his own will, referred to his children, after setting out their names, as his legatees, and he did this on the advice of the family solicitor, who said that the children would be disinherited if they were referred to as such, because there had not been a legal marriage. It was urged also that the fact that Isaac Goodman lived and died in the Jewish faith and could not and would not be married according to the forms of the Christian religion, and could not have married a Christian woman in accord? ance with Jewish rites, was a presumption against the marriage. There was also testimony that members of the family tried to persuade Isaac Goodman to marry a Jewess. Dr. Nathan Adler, described as Chief Rabbi?no longer High Priest38,?of the Con? gregation of British Jews, was examined by the Court and asked: (1) whether Jewish law prohibited the solemnisation of marriage between a Jew and a female of another faith, and (2) whether a Jewish minister, called on to solemnise a marriage between two persons who or either of whom is unknown to him, has it as his duty to make enquiries with a view to ascertaining that both parties are of the Jewish religion. He answered to the first question that the Jewish law prohibited such a marriage, and to the second that 3 Reported in 28 Law Journal, Chancery, p. 745. G 3a See page in.</page><page sequence="6">98 ANGLO-JEWISH CAUSES CELEBRES the Jewish minister was bound to make enquiries. On the other side was the evidence of many persons that Isaac Goodman and the mother of the children had been reputed to be married and had lived together as husband and wife both in England and in Belgium. The judge held that the father and mother should be deemed to have been legally married, in accordance with the English rule which favours the presumption of marriage where persons have lived together for a long period and had children. The onus of proof was on those who sought to disturb the general reputation and presump? tion of marriage. He took account of the Jewish feeling against a marriage with a Christian; the authorities in the Jewish law would rather refuse recognition of the validity of such a marriage, but in these matters the Jews were compelled to recognise the English law. He must view the case as an English marriage, without taking account of the bar in the Jewish law to a mixed union. The case went to the Court of Appeal, which confirmed the judgment of the Vice-Chancellor. The evidence of the Goodman family against the marriage only raised the presumption of an intention to conceal the marriage of a Jew with a person of a different religion, and could not prevail against the legal presumption in favour of the children being legitimate. Another son of Henry Goodman, Lyon, also lived with a Christian woman, and in England had three children by her, without being married. They then moved to Holland with the intention of living there and abandoning their English home. In Amsterdam they went through a valid form of civil marriage. Before the marriage he had another child by her, and after the marriage a fifth child. The question before the English Courts was as to the legitimacy of the two children born in Holland. By the Dutch law, which fol? lowed the Napoleonic Code, subsequent marriage legitimated the children of the parties. By the English law at that time, children born out of wedlock could not be legitimated, but the status of a person is governed by the law of the domicile. Lyon Goodman having changed his domicile from England to Holland, the status of the children born in Holland was governed by the law of Holland</page><page sequence="7">ANGLO-JEWISH CAUSES CELEBRES 99 and not by the English law. The question before the English Court, which was carried to the Court of Appeal, was whether both the children born in Holland could be regarded as entitled to take a share in an inheritance of an English testator governed by an English will, or by the English Statute of Distributions, which prescribes the succession to personal property where the inheritance is not governed by a will. The case was heard in 1880 before Sir George Jessel, Master of the Rolls.4 It went to the Court of Appeal in the following year; and is reported in 17 Chancery Division, page 206. The succession in question was that of Rachel Goodman, a daughter of Henry Goodman, who died a spinster in 1871. By her will, made in 1862, she bequeathed a portion of her residue to a niece. That legacy lapsed because the niece died before her; and there was no provision in the will about its disposition. Of all the family only two brothers had left children, Isaac, whose case is examined above, and Lyon, who had five. It had been held in another case5 that the two girls born in Holland should be regarded as legitimate and therefore entitled to take a share in the estate under the will of the grandfather. But it was argued that that finding did not apply to the succession under the English statute; and it was essential that a child, within the interpretation of the statute, must be legitimate in English law, and not legitimated by the law of a foreign country. One of the children of Isaac Goodman, who had married a Christian in Paris, contested the claim of the two children of Lyon Goodman. Her advocate was David Lindo Alexander, subsequently to be the President of the Jewish Board of Deputies. Before the Chancery Court he was successful. Sir George Jessel upheld the objection and laid down that only children legitimate by English law could take a share of the estate of a person dying domiciled in England and intestate. Appeals from Jessel were seldom successful, but in this case the majority of the Court of Appeal reversed his judgment. Lord Justice James was eloquent about the rule of the comity of nations: " The family relation is the foundation of all society; and 4 Reported in the 14 Law Reports, Chancery Division, p. 619. 5 Goodman v. Goodman; 3 Giffard 643.</page><page sequence="8">100 ANGLO-JEWISH CAUSES CELEBRES it would be axiomatic that a family relation, once duly constituted by the law of a civilised country, should be respected and acknow? ledged by every other member of the community of nations. England for centuries has been a country of hospitality and commerce. It has opened its shores to thousands of political refugees and religious exiles fleeing from persecution. Would it not be asking too much if a man, seeking a home within our country with his family of legitimated children, should find that English hospitality was as bad as the worst form of persecution from which he had escaped, by destroying his family tree, by declaring that the relation of father and child no longer existed, that his rights and duties as a father had ceased, that a child of his parental affection and fatherly pride would be thenceforth, in the contemplation of the law of the new country, a fatherless bastard? " The law laid down by the decision of the Court of Appeal has become an accepted part of the English principles of the conflict of laws; and the name "Goodman" is recorded for all time in the roll of legal precedents. The English Courts, while recognising the legitimation of children of a Jewish father who were born abroad in a country where the father's domicile recognised legitimation, refused to have regard to the Jewish law, which also adopts the principle of legitimation by subsequent marriage, where the Jewish father married abroad the mother of his children but had not effected a change of domicile. That question came up in Levy v. Solomon in 18686. It concerned also an inheritance. The testator gave benefits under his will to his children, subject to their marrying according to the tenets of the Jewish religion, and determinable on their marrying otherwise. By a codicil he gave his residuary estate to the children of his sons and daughters. One of the testator's sons had eight children, three of them born before marriage. The testator knew of the fact of their birth. The son had, in fact, lived with a Jewish woman and sub? sequently married her. It was argued that, on the true construction of the will, all the eight children were entitled to shares, because the testator must be held to intend to benefit all the children 6 Reported in 25th Weekly Reporter, p. 842.</page><page sequence="9">anglo-jewish causes celebres 101 legitimate by Jewish law. The Vice-Chancellor, however, held that it was impossible to give effect to that construction, even if there was no doubt of the testator's intention. The fact that he was a Jew and the children were legitimate according to Jewish law could make no difference. He was administering the law of England, which was the testator's domicile, and unless it could be shown that by something within the four corners of the will the testator meant by " children " illegitimate as well as legitimate children, only the latter could take. Ill Jewish Marriage Law The validity of the Jewish Marriage Law came up for consideration in two leading cases before the same judge in the same year 17957 The judge was Sir William Scott, later Lord Stowell and famous as the Master of International and Prize Law during the Napoleonic wars. At that time questions of marriage law and wills were not dealt with by the judges administering in the common law in the King's Bench, but by judges applying the civil law in the Ecclesias? tical Courts?Doctors' Commons, the Court of Arches and Court of Delegates. It was for the Jewish community a good thing that those who had to interpret the law were accustomed to deal with the principles of the Roman law, with Latin texts, and with foreign principles of jurisprudence, and were not bound by the narrower provisions of the common law. It was also fortunate that the ques? tion of the validity of Jewish law came to be decided by a master of jurisprudence whose authority was unquestioned for generations. Both the cases, tried in the Consistory Court of the Bishop of London, which was more commonly known as Doctors' Commons, concern runaway marriages. In both the validity of the marriage was impugned by the father or guardian of the girl. In both the form 7 The cases of Lindo v. Belisario and Goldsmid v. Bromer. Haggerston's Reports, pp. 216 and 324. See Henriques, op. cit., pp. 23 and 45 ff.</page><page sequence="10">102 ANGLO-JEWISH CAUSES CELEBRES of the action was what is known as jactitation, or boasting, marriage. The man claimed that he was married; and that was denied by the parent or guardian on the ground that the requirements of the Jewish Law were not satisfied. The case of Lin do v. Belisario was referred from the Court of Chancery by the Lord Chancellor to the Ecclesiastical Court for inquiry into the conditions of the Jewish marriage. " The Ecclesias? tical Court" said Sir William Scott, " has undoubted jurisdiction on the general law of marriage, so far as the legality of that institution is constituted by law of this country. It can also consider questions of foreign marriages in the case of British subjects and sometimes of aliens, because of the common principles of the marriage law in Europe. This, however, is a question of a marriage of a very different kind between persons governed by a peculiar law of their own, and administered to a certain degree by a jurisdiction established amongst themselves, which can decide on the questions of law with particular advantage and with a sufficient authority." The questions might have consequently been referred to that special tribunal. Scott dis? claimed profound knowledge of the Jewish law, and feared that a mistake might prove highly prejudicial to " a numerous and respect? able body of people ". The facts of the case were not seriously in issue. Mr. Belisario, a bachelor of 29 years, persuaded Miss Lindo, a girl of sixteen years to run away with him. They went to the house of his brother in Covent Garden where, in the presence of two Jewish witnesses, he gave her a ring and pronounced the Hebrew sentence of the betrothal service. And she declared that she freely and voluntarily became his wife. No consummation of the marriage was alleged; and the action had been brought by the guardian of the girl, Abraham de Mattos Mocatta, to prevent the husband from receiving any part of the property settled on the girl by her parents who were dead. It was asserted by the guardian that the ceremony was not a marriage, nor, according to the Jewish law, a complete betrothal. The Ecclesiastical Court took the evidence by interrogatory of a number of expert Jewish witnesses on the law, some for the husband, some for the</page><page sequence="11">ANGLO-JEWISH CAUSES CELEBRES IO3 wife. Their involved answers troubled the Court. It was alleged that the tribunal amongst the Jews, composed of three persons of competent learning to decide matrimonial questions, had called the parties before them and pronounced the ceremony to be a doubtful betrothal. " Judges," said Sir William Scott, " should make up their minds." The nearest thing in the English law, to a statement that a ceremony is doubtful was failure of proof; and the finding should have been taken as a definite judgment against betrothal. The question was whether what happened was marriage or betrothal. It was said that for a valid marriage a contract in Hebrew must be entered into by the bridegroom with the bride, and that certain formalities should be drawn up by the priest, signed by the bridegroom, entered in a register by the priest, the entry signed by the bridegroom and two witnesses, and the original contract then handed to the bride. That was the gist of a statement produced by the three persons who composed the Jewish Court called the Beth Din. One said that a written contract was not essential to a marriage; and the case was cited of one Henriques, where the marriage with? out a written contract, but after Kidushim, was held good and valid. It was said also that the parties who cohabited after a betrothal without a contract were living in sin venially, but not criminally. The Judge then examined the effect of betrothal (" Kidushim ") according to the Jewish law propounded by the Jewish experts. The woman could not marry another man. She could only be separated by a legal divorce. He considered the texts of the law, looking beyond the living rabbis to the rabbinical authorities which were regarded by the Portuguese Jews. He examined statements produced in a Latin translation by Seiden of Maimonides and Beth Joseph, and made some remarks about them. " To the character of Beth Joseph I confess myself to be an entire stranger. The name of Maimonides is familiar enough to all literate persons as of a very learned scholar who digested and abridged the Talmud." He noted also a passage in Philo-Judaeus about Jewish betrothal and marriage. It was clear that a public celebration of marriage was not necessary. The Chupah was as private as a ceremony can be. Finally, feeling in doubt, he</page><page sequence="12">ANGLO-JEWISH CAUSES CELEBRES addressed specific questions to the Beth Din because he was dealing with a new subject of moment to a large class of British subjects: (i) Whether the interpretation of Beth Joseph that Kidushim consti? tuted a valid marriage was correct. (2) Whether the opinion of Maimonides, as cited by Seiden, was correct. (3) Whether by Jewish law a person who has entered into Kidushim has the right to demand from the wife that she will submit to perform the duties of a wife in matters of matrimony. Subsequently the answers from the Beth Din were read in the Court. They were involved because of the exceptions and conditions prescribed in the law. Evidence was also submitted on behalf of Belisario by one Ish Yemini who was des scribed as a professor of Jewish law at Hamburg and as the former head of Portuguese Jewish congregation in that town. His opinion did not agree with that the Beth Din, and the Judge held that the opinion of the British Beth Din must be preferred. The effect of the answers was that, if the woman, in these circumstances, was called upon to fulfil her engagement, she had nothing to do but to say that she detested the husband and did not choose to continue as his partner. Assuming that to be so, there was difficulty in saying that there was an absolute bond between them; and the Judge, there? fore, pronounced that Belisario had no right to consider himself entitled to the character of a husband. His final remarks about the Jewish law were : " If I were to determine the question of marriage on principles different from the established authorities amongst the Jews as now certified, I should be unhinging every institution, and taking upon myself the responsibility as Ecclesiastical Judge, in opposition to those who possess a more natural right to determine on questions of this kind ". And the decree was simply and curtly : Esther Lindo is not the wife of Abraham Belisario. An appeal was taken to the Court of Arches, a higher tribunal, which was presided over by Sir William Wynne. He confirmed the judgment, after hearing further expert evidence of one Azevido, Reader in the Portu? guese synagogue, and described as the son of the late High Priest8; 8 Moses Cohen d'Azavedo (d. 1784), appointed Haham of the Sephardi community of London in 1761.</page><page sequence="13">ANGLO-JEWISH CAUSES CELEBRES IO5 and also of Solomon Lyon, a ' rabbi' of the German Jewish com? munity.9 His finding was that, while Esther Lindo was not free to marry another man by Jewish law, the imperfect ceremony of betrothal did not give Belisario authority over her fortune or person. " A man cannot be the husband of a woman by the law of England without having civil rights, which Belisario has not; and, therefore, I am of opinion that the sentence given by the Judge in the Consis? tory Court is right, and I confirm it." The second case of jactitation of marriage was instituted on behalf of Miss Goldsmid against Mr. Bromer, both parties being of the Jewish religion. The suggestion was that the alleged marriage was not valid by reason of non-conformity with the Jewish law. Two grounds of invalidity were put forward, the incompetency of the two witnesses who were required as an essential part of the Jewish cere? mony. One of the witnesses was incompetent because of his close relationship to the alleged husband, the other because of his non observance of the Jewish law. The suit was brought by Miss Goldsmid through her father who had previously in the Court of Common Pleas brought an action against Bromer for seduction, but had failed. Bromer justified the marriage by pleading that it had been duly celebrated, and he was married according to the law of the Jews. Both parties then appealed to Jewish law, and the Judge ruled that the question must be decided according to that law. The Jews had enjoyment of their own law in religious matters; and the Marriage Act of 1753 acknowledged their privilege by excepting them and the Quakers out of its provisions. To deny them the bene? fit of their law on such a subject would be to deny to a body of people privileges to which they had long been entitled. The Court must be content to learn the Jewish law from professors of it, and he, therefore, had obtained an expert opinion from the Beth Din and received material evidence from masters of the Jewish law. Bromer had been received as a guest in the house of Goldsmid and obtained the affection of his young daughter, aged sixteen. He 9 (i754-I820.) Not a rabbi, but a teacher of Hebrew at Oxford, Cambridge, and elsewhere.</page><page sequence="14">IO? ANGLO-JEWISH CAUSES CELEBRES persuaded her to elope and go with him to a tavern in Covent Garden, where they were met by two Jewish friends. In their presence Bromer put a ring on her finger and recited the Hebrew declaration. They then co-habited. The grounds on which the marriage was impugned were : that one witness was a cousin-german of Bromer, and the other notoriously violated the Jewish law by disregarding the Sabbath and the ritual of food, and had declared that he was not a religious Jew. The Judge dealt exhaustively with the questions. It was not alleged that the ceremony was defective in other particulars, but it was necessary that it should be performed in the presence of two witnesses not subject to disqualifications imposed by Jewish law. By that law the disqualifications proceed from the degree of consanguinity to either person who marries, or non-conformity in the Jewish religion. Bromer admitted the objec? tion of consanguinity, but pleaded that it must be a relation ex parte paterna, whereas the witness objected to was related ex parte materna. He admitted also the necessity of conformity of the witness with the Jewish laws, but with four exceptions: (i) any breach with the Jewish laws must be deliberate and designed, and not some fact of human infirmity or negligence or mistake; (2) it must be unrepented; (3) it must be proved by witnesses who are themselves unobjection? able; (4) it must be a disqualification arising before the ceremony, and not subsequent to it. The Judge made an observation that, if one witness only were disqualified, it would invalidate the ceremony, because then there would be only one competent witness. He enlarged at the outset on some matters of worldly wisdom which were not specially of Jewish interest. Something has been said [he remarked] of the undue interventions of Miss Goldsmid's father for the purpose of setting aside the matri? monial union. Every parent is deeply interested in the well-being of their [sic] children in such actions, and has the right to question the matrimonial contract entered into in minority of his child. I do not see that in this case the right has been exercised with any impropriety. The young lady seems to have been of the tender age of sixteen, with all the inexperience and susceptibility of a lady of that age, but it is</page><page sequence="15">ANGLO-JEWISH CAUSES CELEBRES IO7 the order of God and the practice of society that the experience of the father should protect the inexperience of the child. It is said he had received Bromer into the family with great familiarity, but it never could be supposed that every man who receives somebody into his family on a basis of civility means that he should marry the daughter. On the reasonableness of the Jewish law, I must take this as I find it. I must observe however, that it does not seem to be without apology or reason, as I take the intention to be to make clandestine marriages almost impossible. As the law of the Jews, by its original incapacity of repeal, is out of protection of the law of the countries in which they dwell?(the Judge had in mind the special legislation which was passed in England to guard against the Gretna Green run-away marriages)?it seems reasonable, therefore, in providing that, if such contracts cannot be rendered null by positive enactments, they should be clogged with ceremonies which render it almost impossible that they should be effectively performed. The validity of the ceremony was sufficiently proved by witnesses, by certificates of a Jewish tribunal, by answers, and by the very form of pleading which allows the invalid? ity in disqualification of a witness alone. The question then is reduced to this: whether the persons before whom the ceremony has been passed are shown to be incompetent, not merely to attest, but to supply a constituent part of the ceremony. Mr. Hesse, one of the two wit? nesses, was accused of non-conformity because he had profaned the Sabbath by riding in coaches, by snuffing candles, and by eating for? bidden meat, acts trifling to us perhaps who have no law applying to them, but not so according to the rites of the Jewish religion. One witness testified that he had seen Hesse repeatedly within ten years do these acts and remonstrated with him, but Hesse replied that he was no Jew, and felt himself bound only to the exterior observation of the religion in compliance with the wishes of his father. One person deposed that Hesse had been seen at a tavern in Frankfurt, known by the sign of The Mulberry-Tree, where meat is not prepared in accordance with the law of the Jews. Later he saw him eat meat in the Hercules Tavern behind the Royal Exchange in London, which is also a tavern where meat is not so prepared. Another witness saw him in the Stock Exchange coffee-house eating a round of meat with a sauce which appeared to be melted butter; and another deposed that he had seen him eating pork. The second witness to the marriage ceremony, Michael Abraham Levy, was a</page><page sequence="16">io8 ANGLO-JEWISH CAUSES CELEBRES first cousin of Bromer, related to him in the second degree of con? sanguinity, the mother of Bromer and his mother being natural and lawful sisters. Sir William Scott remarked about the first testimony that there could not be a stronger disclaimer of all observances " and, if I may so express it, of an uncircumcised heart." It was contended that a conviction was required to establish incompetence. To that he remarked that " while to our notions of law an instant conviction might be necessary, it is not alleged to be so in Jewish law; the disqualification of Hesse was plainly proved on the grounds of non-conformity and that disposed of the whole case." On the incom petency of Levy, the Jewish expert, Ish Yemini, had argued that the relationship did not invalidate because it was on the mother's side. I cannot presume [said Scott] to judge of the eulogies on the witness for his learning, but I may venture to say that want of learning cannot be a principal defect since he appears to be a doctor of rather a loose school. [Scott was famous for his scathing tongue.] I think I perceive something of the Sadducean laxity in his opinion both in this and in the former case, which detracts a little from the respect which other? wise may be given to his erudition. In the former case he had said that Kidushim without co-habiting was a perfect marriage; now he says otherwise. The Talmud, according to him, is the overruling authority, to which the authority of Maimonides and other opposers must bend. The judge adduced a passage of the Talmud which disqualified maternal relations, and also an extract from the Tur, a book of high authority to the same effect. The case, however, does not rest here. I have the judgment of a synod of German Jews to which these parties particularly belong, a sentence of their Beth Din, the chief tribunal. Their judgment has been submitted also to the Portuguese Jews, who concur in it. Here then are courts of high authority on matters of Jewish law entided to the greatest respect, because they are tribunals whose certificate of foreign law must be read as most satisfactory, though perhaps their judgment is not equal in matters of facts. Here is a question com? pounded of law and fact, and though their decision may not bind the Court which has to try the fact for itself, it conveys the best infor</page><page sequence="17">anglojewish causes celebres IO9 mation it can obtain of the principles of the law that are to be applied. They certify they have found the marriage null according to the law of Moses without giving specific reasons for it. This defect, however, is in some measure made up in the reasons they have given in their examination. I, therefore, pronounce against the validity of marriage claimed by Bromer in that he has failed in the proof of the allegation of justification; and that Miss Goldsmid is not his wife. The sentence was affirmed in the Court of Arches in 1799; and by the highest instance of the Delegates in 1800. The judgment reflects the attitude of the English Courts to the Jewish religious laws in the Age of Reason and shows that Jews were regarded as a peculiar people with a religious code which was binding upon them in family matters. It is interesting to contemplate what would be the reaction of an English Court to-day in a claim of invalidation of a Jewish marriage on the ground that one of the witnesses did not eat kosher meat and rode and smoked on the Sabbath day! IV Jewish Divorce Until the middle of the nineteenth century divorce, as distinct from judicial separation, could not be granted by the English Courts. The ecclesiastical tribunals, which dealt with all matters of marriage, did not exercise that jurisdiction; and dissolution of marriage was possible only by a private Act of Parliament. The English Courts, however, were prepared to recognise a divorce granted according to the law and by the Courts of the foreign domicile of a person, domicile being a legal conception based on permanent residence, but connected also with the original home. In two cases which came before the British Courts before the introduction of the general divorce law, the Jewish rules of divorce were considered and were recognised as effective for Jews of foreign origin who were resident in England. The question of divorce was relevant in both cases because of the provision of the English law of that time?when the rule of pleading was highly technical?that a married woman could not sue or be sued herself.</page><page sequence="18">no ANGLO-JEWISH CAUSES CELEBRES The first case was Gaines v. Lady Lanes borough, 179110, and the defendant in this case pleaded that she was legally married to a Jew named King11 and therefore the action was wrongly brought. The plaintiff traversed the plea on the ground that the defendant had failed to prove that she was married. The defendant gave proof of the marriage. But the plaintiff in reply produced evidence that King, the husband, had been married to another woman who was still living. Thereupon the defendant offered to prove that King and his former wife, a Jewess, were divorced in Leghorn according to the rites and customs of the Jews, and after that divorce it was com? petent to either party to marry again. She produced an instrument under the seal of the head of the Synagogue of Leghorn. Lord Kenyon, the Chief Justice, held that the Jewish law must be proved in the same way as the law of the foreign country, by expert wit? nesses. The defendant apparently could not do that, but called the former wife to prove the divorce. An objection that she was an incompetent witness was overruled, and she swore that she was divorced before the Rabbis at Leghorn according to the Jewish usage. There was no further argument. The Court held that the divorce was valid, and, therefore, the defendant was legally married and was entitled to a verdict.12 The second case was tried some fifty years later; Eliza Moss v. Seth Smith13. The action was brought against a bailee for damaging goods and failing to re-deliver others. The plaintiff in the case was a Jewish woman, Eliza Moss, who was suing in her own right as a single woman. In the course of the trial the plaintiff's son testified that his father, David Moss, and his mother had cohabited from the time of his infancy till he was seven years old, when, it was alleged, they were divorced. David Moss, the father, was still living. It was claimed that the plaintiff was a married woman at the time of the 10 Reported in i Peake, p. 25. 11 For John King, alias Jacob Rey (ca. 1753-1823), adventurer and financier, see Notes and Queries, ix and xi; Annual Register (Rivington Edition), 1824; Picciotto, Sketches of Anglo-Jewish History, p. 303; and Rubens, Anglo^Jewish Portraits, p. 59. 12 See Henriques, op. cit., p. 59. 13 Reported in Granger &amp; Manning, p. 228.</page><page sequence="19">ANGLO-JEWISH CAUSES CELEBRES III contract and, therefore, not entided to sue. Plaintiff's counsel under? took to show that her original marriage had been legally dissolved according to the Jewish laws. Dr. Solomon Herschel, the Chief Rabbi, as it is put in the reports?" commonly called the High Priest of the German Jews "?and officers of the Synagogue were called. The book of divorces, kept by the Superintendent of the Synagogue in Brooks Gardens, contained an entry of the divorce in Hebrew, and it was produced by the Superintendent, who had been present at the divorce proceedings. It also appeared in the evidence of Dr. Herschel that, to constitute a valid divorce by Jewish law, a written document of divorce must be delivered by the husband to the wife in the presence of the " High Priest " and ten persons at least. The Hebrew document was not produced by the plaintiff, and the " High Priest " stated that he had not been requested to bring it with him. On this evidence it was contended that, though the Jewish marriage was exempted from the marriage law, a common law marriage, whether of Jews or Christians, if validly contracted in England, can be dissolved only by Act of Parliament; and also, supposing a Jewish marriage was capable of dissolution, in the absence of the document of divorce there was no evidence before the Court that it had taken place. Mr. Justice Erskine, without deciding the broader issue about the validity of a Jewish divorce dissolving a marriage of Jews in England, held that the divorce was not established and gave the defendant leave to enter a verdict. Since the Divorce Act was passed, no attempt has been made to argue the validity of the Get granted by rabbinical authorities in England as effective to dissolve a marriage of Jews domiciled in England. The provision of the law is too clearly against any such contention. The case has not been so transparendy clear with regard to the dissolution of marriage abroad, according to the Jewish law, of Jewish parties who were then living abroad and were afterwards domiciled in England. But a decision given in 1908 indicates that religious divorce will not be regarded as valid in England. Friedberg v. Friedberg was a suit for divorce in the English Courts, and it was contended for the woman petitioner that her marriage should</page><page sequence="20">112 anglo-jewish causes celebres be annulled because it was bigamous. The husband had previously been married, and had obtained a divorce in Riga from the Rabbi? nical authorities and then contracted the second marriage in Scotland. The Court upheld the plea, and declared that the Jewish divorce was not valid. V A Jewish Marriage Settlement Naphtali Franks v. Joseph Martin, Lazarus Simons A remarkable case which was fought in the English Courts concerned the will of Moses Hart14, one of the leading Jews on 'Change, and described as the second founder of the Great Syna? gogue, whose brother, Aaron, was the Rabbi of the German-Jewish community. The case involved the members of the two leading Ashkenazi families of Hart and Franks, including the " great Jew ", Naphtali Franks15. It was carried to the House of Lords, on an appeal from the Court of the Lord Chancellor; and it is set out in the records of the House for the years 1757-60, where may be seen Hebrew documents amongst the pleadings. The case arose out of the settlement made by Moses Hart in 1720, on the marriage of his eldest daughter Sinha (sc. " Simha ") with Isaac Franks, and the will which he made shordy before his death in 1756. Moses Hart, at the time of the marriage, was engaged in large operations of buying and selling stocks, to the value of one and a half million pounds, and had a big capital. Isaac Franks, the husband, was a jeweller worth about ^80,000. Sinha, the bride, was fifteen years of age. Hart, when treating about the settlement, was unwilling to part with any considerable share of his capital. He, 14 (i675_I75^-) The head of the London Ashkenazi community. Dictionary of National Biography, s.v. 15 (1715?96.) A successor of Hart as the head of the Ashkenazi community. Naphtali married his first cousin, Phila, daughter of Isaac Franks, who died in 1736, and subsequently Sinha, otherwise Frances, daughter of Moses Hart.</page><page sequence="21">ANGLO-JEWISH CAUSES CELEBRES II3 therefore, proposed to give Isaac Franks a present fortune of &gt;f 9,000, together with ^600 for the trousseau, and to secure the payment of an additional fortune on his death, as provided in the contract, which was drawn up in Hebrew. There were various conditions about the share of the husband and the wife, in case one or the other died within the first two years; but the relevant condition prescribed that '' Moses Hart, spontaneously and of a willing mind obliged himself, as an absolute debt, binding upon his heirs, which his children should perform ", as follows: " My daughter Sinha and Isaac Franks and his and her children shall divide with my sons a half-share of the sum which I shall think fair to be inherited by the most beloved of my sons. The half-share to be exclusive of Real Estate, which shall belong to my sons only ". Any unmarried daughters were to take each ^6,000 and ?600 for clothes out of the estate. The residue was to be divided, as to two shares to the sons, to Isaac Franks and his daughter a half-share, and to the other daughters the half-share of a son. Two parts of the setdement were written in Hebrew, " in the characters commonly used by the German Jews The docu? ment was drawn up by Rabbi Aaron Hart, and stamped and signed in the presence of the Readers and Secretary of the Synagogue. " Kinyan, or possession, was taken thereon, which is commonly used among Jews in obligations to be most binding ". An English translation of the document made by a notary, skilled in the lan? guage, was said to have been signed by the parties, but could not be found. All that was discovered, after the death of Hart, was a translation on parchment, engrossed and with many blanks and not signed. At the time of the settlement Hart had one son, aged ten years, and four daughters. The other three daughters married Elias Levy, one Adolphus, and Henry Isaac Franks. Settlements were made on their marriages by which the father setded a larger sum than that given on the marriage of Sinha. Isaac Franks and his wife had children, and two of the other daughters also had children. Henry Isaac Franks, however, was soon after his marriage found to be a lunatic, and Aaron Franks was appointed the committee of his H</page><page sequence="22">114 ANGLO-JEWISH CAUSES CELEBRES person and estate. The only son of Moses Hart died, unmarried and intestate, in the lifetime of his father. By his will Moses Hart divided his property between the families of the other daughters and left nothing to the children of Isaac Franks. Before witnesses he declared that he did not regard himself as bound by the settlement made on the marriage to leave any particular share to that family, and that he understood the settlement to be only a marriage contract?a \etuba ?and not to fetter his power of disposition by will. The will was proved in the Prerogative Court of Canterbury; and then the plain? tiffs applied to the executors, one of whom was Lazarus Simons, the Secretary of the Synagogue, for an account of the estate and a settlement of the claims under the marriage setdement. That was refused by the executors, and they filed a Bill in Chancery. The respondents, who represented the other interests of the family, filed a Cross-Bill, calling for discovery of the English translation of the Hebrew document. The Lord Chancellor held that, in the events which had happened, viz., the settler's death without leaving a son surviving him, there was no valid obligation to bequeath any part of his personal estate to the family of his daughter Sinha. It was impossible to place any exact construction on the words of the Hebrew document, and the clause about further provision failed. Expert evidence was given about the nature of the marriage setde? ment. It was not just a marriage contract (a \etuba), but an instru? ment in the nature of a shtar?known as Starr in the pre-Expulsion period?and the clause about the daughter being entitled to half the share of the son was described in the Hebrew words : Hatzi-Hele\ Zachar. Prominent Jews, influenced by English manners and institutions, were modifying the traditional marriage contract by a more elaborate legal instrument, which followed the substance, but not the language, of an English family settlement. It was argued for the respondents to the claim that the purport of this clause was only to prevent the father favouring one son more than the others, so that, if he left sons and daughters, Sinha should receive at least half the share given to the most favoured son. It was urged, on the other side, that, by Jewish law, a married daughter</page><page sequence="23">ANGLO-JEWISH CAUSES CELEBRES "5 who had received her portion on her marriage, was totally excluded from her share of the father's estate, and, therefore, an instrument, such as this shtar, was necessary to secure her share both in case of intestacy and also against a disposition by will to other members of the family. The difficulty was to ascertain what share was meant in the event by the half-share of the son; but the father, having made the settlement, was not entitled to disinherit any son and so to leave the daughters nothing. Witnesses were brought to prove that Moses Hart had, in fact, a very poor knowledge of the Hebrew language and, therefore, could not understand the terms of the Hebrew docu? ment which he signed?even though it was drawn up by his brother, the principal Rabbi of the Community. It was said, on this point, that, while he was one of the elders of the Synagogue, the conver? sations and discussions of the German-Jewish Synagogue were held in English or in " Low German ", and that he could barely sign his name in the Hebrew language. The rules of the Synagogue were written in Low German?which was a different language from Hebrew?and was the language used by the Jews; and few of the Jews in England understood Hebrew. There was also evidence that Moses Hart, being ignorant of Hebrew, had to turn to his servants to interpret Hebrew words mixed with the Low German in letters which he received. Expert evidence testified to the complication of the contract, which, it was said, should be divided into four. Hirsch L?bel, otherwise Hart Lyon16, who had succeeded Aaron Hart as Rabbi of the Great Synagogue of London, swore that, supposing a Jew, on the marriage of his daughter, agrees that she and her issue by the husband shall divide with the sons half the share of a son, he apprehended the meaning of the words to be that, if the father should think proper to favour one son more than another, such daughter's half-share of a son should be considered to be the half share of the preferred son. He never knew such a case to happen as was stated to him, and he could not depose about it without having sufficient time to study several sacred and Rabbinical books relating 16 (1721-1800.) See Dictionary of National Biography and Hyamson, History of the Jews in England, p. 244.</page><page sequence="24">Il6 ANGLO-JEWISH CAUSES CELEBRES to the statutes and nature of contracts in the Hebrew and Rabbinical languages. The House of Lords dismissed the appeal, and gave judgment confirming the decree of the Lord Chancellor, who rejected the Bill. Their reasons are not recorded in the Journal. It may well be that Moses Hart, like later Parnassim, was ignorant of Hebrew and could not have passed an examination in the trans? lation of the document which he signed. But we may take leave to doubt the sincerity or accuracy of the statement that he, a pillar of the Synagogue, did not know the contents of the shtar, and thought that it was a \etuba, containing the regular provision for the wife. Jews must have seemed a strange people to the judges and lawyers of the eighteenth century with their curious contracts and their curious Hebrew and Low German languages and their pertinacity in pursuing family affairs in the Law Courts. VI Jewish Charities The progress in the removal of Jewish civil disabilities is illustrated by three decisions of the Courts about bequests of Jewish testators for the benefit of Jewish religious charities. In the eighteenth cen? tury the Jewish community, though professing what the Romans would have called a licita religio, was still regarded as holding a faith which was opposed to Christianity, and, therefore, the State and the Courts would do nothing to assist in the propagation of their faith. That survival of intolerance remained till the early days of Queen Victoria. Then it was swept away by an Act of Parliament of 1846, which declared that: " Her Majesty's subjects professing the Jewish religion in respect of their schools, places of religious worship, educational and charitable purposes, and property held thereunder, shall be subject to the same laws as Her Majesty's Protestant subjects dissenting from the Church of England are subject to, and not further or otherwise." Thereafter, the bequests</page><page sequence="25">ANGLO-JEWISH CAUSES CELEBRES 117 for Jewish charities, provided that they complied with the general principles of the law governing charities, and were not against the broad principles of public policy, were held valid. The first of the cases is da Costa v. de Paz, decided in the reign of George II17. It concerned the provision in a will of Elias de Paz. He left a sum of ?1,200 to his trustees to maintain a Yeshivah annually for the daily reading of the Jewish Law. It was argued that the bequest was bad, both because it was for superstitious uses and as being opposed to the Christian religion. The Attorney-General who, on behalf of the King, is the guardian of charities and is represented in the Court when there is a dispute about the validity of a bequest for charities, personally supported the application in favour of the bequest. He remarked that it was only for the propa? gation of the law which is allowed in the Church and is the foundation of the Christian religion. It was urged, also, that the spirit of the Act of Toleration, passed in the reign of William and Mary, removed the old barriers against the Jewish religion and any? thing that tended to its maintenance. Lord Hardwicke, however, dismissed the application, and said that he could not decree the validity of the bequest since Christianity was the religion of the land. There was a great difference between putting hardship on persons because of religion and establishing their religion by an act of the Courts. It would be a different consideration if there was a Jewish charity for the support of poor persons of the Jewish religion. The Act of Tolerance only exempted persons from the penal laws, and did not extend to validate charities for dissenting and non Christian religions. It was, however, argued successfully that there was a charitable intention, even though its primary purpose could not be carried out. In accordance, therefore, with the institution known by the Norman-French name Cy-Pres, by which a charitable intention should be carried out as near as possible to the testator's wishes, the bequest was transferred to the Foundling Hospital, to be used for teaching the children the rudiments of Christianity. There was indication elsewhere in the Will that the testator wished 17 Reported in Ambrose, p. 228.</page><page sequence="26">Il8 ANGLO-JEWISH CAUSES CELEBRES to benefit that hospital to which he bequeathed a legacy. That was perhaps fortunate; otherwise the bequest might have been given to the Society for the Propagation of Christianity among the Jews. The second case, Straus v. Goldsmid was decided in the first year of Queen Victoria, 183718. A testator left a third of his residue to the Wardens of the Great Synagogue in the City of London on a trust that the interest or dividends should be distributed every year on the eve of Passover among at least ten worthy men who have wives and children, among whom there ought to be some learned men, to purchase meat and wine fit for service on the two Passover nights. Francis Goldsmid, one of the great family, appeared for the respondent to the summons, who was another member of the family and a Warden of the Great Synagogue. Francis (afterwards Sir Francis) Goldsmid19 was the first Jewish barrister admitted at Lincoln's Inn, having been allowed by a special ruling of the Benchers to dispense with the final words of the Oath of Abjuration so that he might be called, and the first Jewish Bencher of any Inn. After a distinguished career at the Bar he became a Member of Par? liament, and a statue of him stands to this day outside the library of Lincoln's Inn preserving the likeness of his handsome counten? ance and recording his achievement for Jewish equality. The Attorney-General again appeared, but this time raised the question whether the bequest was legal, in view of the decision in the case da Costa v. de Paz. The Statute of Victoria, which expressly gives to Jews the same freedom of charitable disposition as had been accorded to other non-conformists, was not yet passed. The Vice Chancellor of the Court of Chancery, however, brushed aside the objection. There was nothing here which in any way conflicted with Christian principles or teaching; and the bequest, being intended to enable persons professing the Jewish religion to observe their rites, was good. The third case re Michel's Trust, decided in i86020, more definitely 18 Reported in 8 Simons, p. 614. 19 (1808-78.) See Dictionary of National Biography. 20 Reported in 28 Bevan, p. 39.</page><page sequence="27">ANGLO-JEWISH CAUSES CELEBRES IIQ marked the reversal of the old disabilities. It concerned the bequest of a Jew who died in 1821, and left a legacy of ^10 a year to be paid to the Wardens and Parnassim of a congregation in a town in Poland, for three persons to learn in the Beth Hamidrash two hours daily, and on the anniversay of the testator's death, " to say the Candish prayer ". The reporter muddled the word Kaddish. The testator's widow, who had a life interest in the estate, died in 1822. Thereafter the executors for some years sent the money to Poland. But they discontinued doing so, considering the bequest was invalid; and the income was paid over to the Commissioners for the reduction of the National Debt. Subsequently doubts arose about this action and the surviving executor presented a petition to the Court for a ruling. The counsel who appeared included two Jews who were to make their mark, one a very big mark, in English law. They were for the petitioners, Jacob Waley, who became a famous conveyancer and was an ancestor of a family distinguished in many ways, and the counsel for the Parnassim in Poland, George Jessel, who was to be, as Sir George, Solicitor-General, and the first Jew to hold Govern? ment office, and later, as Master of the Rolls, one of the most brilliant lights of the courts in the century. Jessel relied on the statute of Victoria, which, he pointed out, was retrospective in its operation. The fact, therefore, that the testator died before the statute was enacted was immaterial. Counsel for the residuary legatee argued that the bequest was void for superstitious uses because it meant praying for the testator's soul. An old statute of the time of the Reformation, directed against Roman Catholics, made that prac? tice illegal. He argued, also, that it was void as a perpetuity and for uncertainty, two of the grounds on which imperfect charitable bequests could be invalidated. The case was heard before the Master of the Rolls, Sir James Romilly, who gave judgment in favour of the charity. I have no doubt about the validity of the bequest, and therefore the duty of the Court is to carry it into effect. The Jews are in the same position as the Roman Catholics. I see nothing in the bequest which is superstitious. [He had already felt a difficulty about Roman</page><page sequence="28">120 ANGLO-JEWISH CAUSES CELEBRES Catholics and Jews, who were not quite in the same position as Protes? tant dissenters:] If it be a part of the form of their religion that prayers should be said for the benefit of the souls of the dead, it would be difficult to say that, as a religious ceremony practised by a dissent? ing class of religionists, it could be deemed superstitious, in the legal sense in which those words were used prior to the passing of the Statute of Victoria. But here, there is nothing said about praying for the soul of anyone. Three persons are to read the Bible in the Beth Hamidrash, and to say the prayer of the Candish (Evidence had been given by a representative of the Jewish ecclesiastical Court about the nature of the Kaddish prayer, which was in praise of God and an expression of the resignation to His will.) I do not know that there would be anything superstitious in a bequest by a member of the Church of England to the Wardens to select scholars to learn the Greek Testament for two hours daily and on certain days to repeat the Lord's Prayer, although the day selected was the anniversary of the birth of the founder. There was nothing here to show that this was to be done under the notion that the soul of the testator would derive any benefit. It is a valid bequest for the benefit of a Jewish charity, and the executors must pay over the dividends to the Parnassim. Note. In the case which was tried in 1879 (Hodgson v. Halford; reported in 11 Chancery Division, 595) the Court of the Chancery Judge held that a parent disposing by will of his property is perfectly entitled in making pfovision in favour of such of his children as shall not embrace a particular faith, be it Christian, Roman-Catholic, Jewish or Mohammedan. In the later case (Clayton v. Ramsden\ which is reported in 1943 All English Reports 16), the forfeiture clause applied to a child " who should marry a person not of Jewish parentage and of the Jewish faith." The Court of Appeal upheld the policy of the clause on the ground that the reference was to religion, which could be answered out of the mouth of the person concerned. The House of Lords, however, reversed the decision, holding that Jewish parentage meant Jewish race, which was too vague a term to support a valid condition. And they were divided on the question whether Jewish faith was too vague. The wheel has come almost full circle since the Act of Queen Anne required a Jewish parent to maintain a child who abandoned the Jewish faith. Tolerance is now a ground for invalidating a condition in a will which attempts to hold descendants to loyalty to the Jewish religion.</page></plain_text>