Aaron Aaronsohn: forgotten man of history?

<plain_text><page sequence="1">Jewish Historical Studies, volume 40, 2005 Aaron Aaronsohn: forgotten man of history?" CECIL BLOOM In 1882 Ephraim Fischel Aaronsohn left Romania and took his wife and young son on Aliyah. He helped set up an agricultural settlement at Zichron Ya'akov near Haifa where they had five more children. He became one of the Yi$huv\ leading farmers, but was famed less for his pioneering achievements than as the father of some remarkable offspring. The most important of these is the eldest son, Aaron Aaronsohn (1876-1919), who became the leading agronomist in the country and contributed much to the development of agriculture there. He is remembered mostly, however, for creating an espionage network designed to help the British Army in its conflict with Turkey in the First World War, for his subsequent work as an influential member of British operational staff in Cairo and for later activi ties on behalf of the Zionist movement. The successful British campaign against Turkey was helped materially by his knowledge of Palestine. Yet his role in Zionist history and in the NILI espionage organization, that he was instrumental in founding and which was vital for securing Allenby's victory, has largely been ignored by historians. This paper will endeavour to show that Aaronsohn's contribution to Zionist history in the 1914-19 period was significant, although many Jewish (but fewer non-Jewish) contemporaries almost completely ignored him. This paper will also suggest why history has treated him so shabbily. At the age of thirteen he was brought to Baron Edmond de Rothschild's attention and, four years later, was sent to agricultural school in France for two successful years before returning home to become an agronomist in Metullah, a new settlement at the northernmost point of the country. He left Metullah to help set up an organization for handling technical issues relating to agriculture. For his tremendous energy and enthusiasm the Turks called him Shaitan (the Arabic for 'devil').1 In 1906 he discovered a weather-resistant variety of wheat in the Galilee called Triticum dicoccoides (Wild Emmer wheat), an important discovery for Palestinian agriculture2 * An earlier version of this paper was presented to the Leeds branch of the Society on 6 June 2005. 1 A. Verrier (ed.) Agents of Empire (London 1995) 107. 2 Ibid. 177</page><page sequence="2">Cecil Bloom that made his name in agronomy circles. Aaronsohn found that Emmer wheat, which is able to endure the most extreme climatic conditions, grew satisfactorily at 325-500 feet below the Mediterranean near the Jabbok trib utary of the Jordan, as well as up to 6000 feet above sea level at Mount Hermon. His status as an authority on agricultural science grew over the next few years and led in 1909 to an invitation by the United States Department of Agriculture to visit America. He impressed many experts there and published a paper under the auspices of the US Department of Agriculture in which he pointed out similarities in terms of agricultural conditions between Palestine and California and adjacent southwest US states, and recommended introducing some cereal crops from Palestine into these parts of the US.3 His advice on improving husbandry, although he was from a small undeveloped country, led to the offer of the chair of agri culture at the University of California, Berkeley, which he refused. He impressed many American Jews, in particular the influential Henrietta Szold, Jacob Schiff and Louis Marshall. Dr David Fairchild of the Department of Agriculture once wrote that when a 'short, light complexioned Jew' walked into his office 'I soon discovered I was in the presence of an extraordinary man'.4 Aaronsohn's story as told to Fairchild 'seemed like a chapter out of the Arabian Nights', and he believed that but for his premature death, Aaronsohn would have been responsible for bring ing into existence 'a type of experimental agriculture which would be epoch-making'.5 Aaronsohn's contacts in America enabled him to obtain funds to establish an experimental station in Palestine, which was set up in 1910 at Athlit a few miles south of Haifa at the foot of Mount Carmel. The station, the first in the Middle East, originally employed Arab labourers, Aaronsohn having been in favour of Jewish settlements using both Arab and Jewish labour. But this was a controversial view and he later changed his mind and opted for complete separation between Jews and Arabs. He became contemptuous of the Arab masses and their leaders, because he discerned a lack of a sense of justice and human rights. He saw no way in which the Arabs, either the rulers or the masses, could be possible partners in any negotiations on the future of the country.6 In opposition to the local view that the Yishuv\ future was bound up with Turkey, he became convinced that Zionism would only flourish if Palestine could be placed under British protection and serve British interests. The local view was expressed by two of its leaders, David Ben-Gurion and Itzhak Ben-Zvi, 3 A. Aaronsohn, Agricultural and Botanical Exploration in Palestine (Washington, DC 1910). 4 D. Fairchild, The World was my Garden (New York and London 1938) 356. 5 D. Fairchild, 'The Dramatic Careers ofTwo Plantsmen' The Journal of Heredity X no. 6 (June 1919) 280. 6 Y. Gorny, Zionism and the Arabs, 1882-1Q48 (Oxford 1987) 56-7. 178</page><page sequence="3">Aaron Aaronsohn: forgotten man of history? who supported ties to Turkey and who had actually written to the Turkish military commander in Palestine, Djemal Pasha, to express the strength of their ties with the Ottoman Empire, 'which has given our people shelter for hundreds of years'.7 They also pleaded with the Turks for permission to organize a Jewish military unit for local defence.8 Aaronsohn's stature in American agricultural circles led in 1914 to his appointment to a committee headed by Arthur Ruppin, the first Zionist administrator in Palestine, responsible for the distribution to the Yishuv of American funds to help relief operations.9 His reputation with the Turkish authorities was also high; he was in regular contact with them on agricul tural matters and his prestige with the Turks became even greater when he successfully fought a serious plague of locusts in the region in 1915-16. He was appointed chief inspector of a group charged with combating this plague, and the Turks also tried to enlist his services for agricultural devel opment. But this he rejected because he was convinced, as a result of his dealings with the Turks, that the only way to ensure the country was devel oped was to rid it of their rule. Through his agricultural work he had become a confidant of Djemal Pasha, but he became convinced that this despot would have no hesitation in destroying Zionism if it suited him.10 There were three Aaronsohn siblings other than Aaron - Alexander, Sarah and Rivka - all associated closely with Aaron's work and all bitter at the way in which Jewish settlers were treated. Conditions in the country for Christians as well as Jews became hard after Germany started to dominate Turkey and much Jewish-owned property was seized. With the outbreak of hostilities in the region, the Aaronsohns saw opportunities for positive action against this Turkish rule. Joined by Avshalom Feinberg, formerly a poet in Paris and by then secretary of the Athlit station, they established an organization called the Gideonites that was committed to fight the Turks. The Gideonites decided to try to collude with the British, whom they now saw as pro-Zionist. They were opposed to the policies of Yishuv leaders like Ben-Gurion and Ben-Zvi who appeared happy to be part of the Ottoman Empire. The Gideonites were convinced that an Allied victory in the war was essential if the Yishuv was to make progress, and they began to work hard to convince the Allies that they could be of special assistance in achiev ing an Allied victory by their ability to provide key information to the British military. The Athlit station eventually became their centre and Aaron, who became known as jfasooz ('the Spy') by settlers who disagreed with his activities,11 built up an efficient intelligence network. 7 B. Litvinoff, Ben Gurion of Israel (London 1954) 72. 8 D. Ben-Gurion (ed.) The Jews in their Land (London 1966) 293. 9 A. Bein (ed.) Arthur Ruppin: Memoirs, Diaries, Letters (London 1971) 151. 10 I. Friedman, The Question of Palestine, 11)14-18 (London 1973) 121. 11 H. V. F. Winstone, The Illicit Adventure (London 1982) 226. 179</page><page sequence="4">Cecil Bloom The Yishuv leadership at this stage was determined to avoid any confrontation with the rulers of the land and dissociated itself from Aaronsohn's group whom it regarded as made up of dangerous adventurers. Aaronsohn was stigmatized as a man who endangered the Yishuv, but the Gideonites' operation supplied highly detailed information to the British that helped Allenby to victory at Megiddo in September 1918, his entry into Damascus in early October and the capture of Aleppo at the end of the month that forced Turkey to seek peace. The Aaronsohns, however, paid a bitter price with the tragic death of Sarah. Even fifty years later Ben-Gurion was dismissive of NILI, writing that its activities provoked the Turks into taking severe measures against the Yishuv that made conditions desperate.12 Feinberg, who was murdered by Bedouins in December 1916 while he was attempting to make contact with the British, can be credited with responsibility for the basic idea of the espionage ring. (His bones were found in the Sinai desert in 1967 near a fine palm tree that must have sprung from dates in his rations.13) In January 1915 the Turks arrested him and accused him of having made contact with British Navy ships moored off Haifa Bay. He was, however, released for lack of evidence. He then presented Aaron with a plan for providing the British with anti-Turkish intelligence. As a result, Alexander Aaronsohn was sent to try to make contact with the British in Egypt. In disguise and using a false Spanish passport, he managed to board the American cruiser Des Moines and reached Egypt later in 1915, but the British were not interested in his proposals for local Palestinian help and were suspicious that he might be an enemy agent. Feinberg was then despatched to Cairo to join Alexander. He impressed the officer in charge of intelligence at Port Said (Lieutenant Leonard Woolley, later the eminent archaeologist), and managed to convince the British that an efficient system for passing critical intelligence to them could be established. In November 1915 the British agreed on an espionage operation centred on Athlit. Feinberg returned to Palestine to help initiate the operation but, despite their acceptance of the plan, it received little attention and support from the British. Alexander Aaronsohn then went to the United States where he became active as a lecturer and propagandist and wrote With the Turks in Palestine that disclosed much about the oppressive rule of the Turks. Rivka joined her brother in the US to appeal for funds. Alexander eventually returned to Cairo in October 1917, became a captain of intelli gence and was awarded the DSO. In the Second World War he served in the British Intelligence Service. 12 D. Ben-Gurion (see n. 8) 293. 13 A. Engle, The NILI Spies (London and Portland, Or. 1997) vii. i8o</page><page sequence="5">Aaron Aaronsohn: forgotten man of history? Throughout this time Aaron Aaronsohn was working primarily as an agronomist, but, receiving information of a second Turkish attempt to seize the Suez Canal, he decided to go to London to impress on the British the value of his group's intelligence plans. He reached London in October 1916 travelling via Germany and Denmark. To do so, he first went to Constantinople to convince the authorities that he had a scheme for produc ing oil from sesame, explaining that he needed to go to an experimental station in Sweden to finalize his research. On arriving in Germany he took a boat sailing to America via Denmark, and in Copenhagen met Judah Magnus who had been visiting war-devastated Europe on behalf of American Jewish relief organizations. Magnus helped Aaronsohn board a ship bound for the United States where he stayed in Magnus's cabin.14 The ship docked in Kirkwall in the Orkneys and, having arranged with the British beforehand, Aaronsohn was 'arrested', taken off the vessel and whisked off to Scotland Yard in London where Sir Basil Thomson, the head of the Criminal Investigation Branch (CID), interviewed him to check his authenticity. Thomson later described the impression Aaronsohn gave as 'one of the most romantic incidents of the war'15 and, within a five-week period in London, he put to the General Staff in the War Office a plan for a detailed intelligence network between Palestinian Jews and the British. He made it clear that his motivation was to help Britain liberate Palestine and release its Jewry from Turkish rule. He was grilled at length by British military intel ligence and gave them key information on Turkish military activities, much of which had been rejected when offered in Egypt by Alexander. Aaron impressed the British that his group was in a position to supply information on the political and military weaknesses of the Turks and therefore to allow the development of a successful plan for combat in the Middle East. He and his group were lucky in their timing. The government had begun to be concerned about the situation in the Middle East and accepted Aaron as a suitable and reliable agent for British intelligence. The proposed organization was called NILI, an acronym of words from I Samuel 15:29 —Netzah Yisra'el Lo Yeshaker, 'the strength of Israel will not lie' — chosen when the British officer with whom contact was established at Athlit asked for a password. A Bible was opened at the page containing this verse.16 Aaronsohn moved from London to Cairo in November 1916 to help plan the invasion of Palestine, but he was first grilled again to ensure he was genuine. Norman Bentwich in Army Intelligence in Cairo, who was assigned to check his story, wrote that the two of them spent a day walking 14 N. Bentwich, 7"^7i L. Magnus (London n.d.) 73. 15 Sir Basil Thomson, Queer People (London 1922) 201. 16 A. Engle (see n. 13) 98. i8i</page><page sequence="6">Cecil Bloom along the banks of the Nile and that within a few hours he had no doubt that Aaronsohn's 'one and only purpose was to aid Great Britain in redeeming Palestine from the Turkish yolk'.17 Having passed this test, Aaronsohn proceeded to convert a number of key British officers to his cause. Among the senior British officials in the region who were won over to his ideas were Mark Sykes of Sykes-Picot fame, Philip Graves, Wyndham Deedes who became Chief Secretary to Herbert Samuel when he was appointed High Commissioner in Palestine, Richard Meinertzhagen who was Director of Military Intelligence and William Ormsby-Gore. Ormsby-Gore later became British Colonial Secretary and was one of the few government ministers of his time to show sympathy towards Zionism. He admired Aaronsohn greatly and accepted many of his concepts and observations, relying on him for information on the strategic situation in Turkish Palestine. It has been claimed that there was hardly a memorandum written by Ormsby-Gore in Cairo that did not bear the stamp of Aaronsohn's ideas.18 Sykes's conversion to Zionism was said to be almost entirely due to Aaronsohn's influence. Sykes, who was deeply involved in the negotiations that led to the Balfour Declaration, first heard of the existence of a pro British Jewish underground movement during a long talk with Aaronsohn when they first met. This gave rise to his decision to bring the Zionist issue into the government strategy being developed in the Middle East, and his endeavours to guide his government towards bringing Palestine under British and not French control. He believed it vital for there to be a British controlled barrier between the Arab kingdoms and the French in Syria.19 The more Sykes saw of Aaronsohn the more he liked his 'forthright patriot ism', and confidence in the success of Zionism.20 When the time came, Sykes was determined to ensure that the main principles proposed for the Balfour Declaration were adhered to. One historian has dubbed the declara tion the 'Sykes Declaration'.21 Weizmann had planned to visit Cairo in April 1917 to work for a Jewish Palestine under a British protectorate, but when he decided not to go because the British military advance was being checked, Sykes suggested to the Foreign Office that Weizmann be asked to appoint Aaronsohn in his place.22 There is no record of a reply from Weizmann. N. Bentwich, My Seventy Seven Years (London 1962) 43. I. Friedman (see n. 10) 127. M. Verete, 'The Balfour Declaration and its Makers' Middle East Studies VI (6 January 1970) 51-9 R. Adelson, Mark Sykes (London 1975) 213. M. Verete (see n. 19) 66. Public Record Office (hereafter PRO), Foreign Office Papers (hereafter FO) FO371/3052. 182</page><page sequence="7">Aaron Aaronsohn: forgotten man of history? Meinertzhagen, a non-Jew, had been an anti-Semite until he met Aaronsohn, but changed his mind after their many talks on Palestine and became an ardent Zionist. Aaronsohn's 'dynamic personality, courage and enthusiasm ... for the National Home and the injustice inflicted on the Jews by Gentiles' was responsible for Meinertzhagen's conversion.23 He described Aaron as a man who 'feared nothing and had an immense intel lect'.24 In his Middle East Diary, published in 1959, he enigmatically wrote that he was not at liberty to divulge many of NILI's exploits, as it would 'publicise methods best kept secret'.25 To Leopold Amery, Aaronsohn was a 'real Palestinian' and 'if all the Jews in their own country turn out as sturdy frank-looking fellows as he, Zionism will certainly be justified'.26 Graves, whom Weizmann claimed was no special friend of Zionism, once told Sykes that Aaronsohn is 'good stuff with lots of knowledge and grit and reconciles me much to Zionism'.27 Aaronsohn also had a strong influence on Wyndham Deedes, who once referred to him as a man who was 'startlingly blunt, but never said anything behind a person's back that he would not say to his face'.28 Not all his contacts with British officials, however, were so cordial. After dealings with T. E. Lawrence shortly before the start of the Arab Revolt, he wrote in his diary that their interview had been 'devoid of amenity' and that Lawrence was 'infatuated with himself. As he listened to him, Aaronsohn could almost imagine he was attending a conference by a 'scientific anti-semitic Prussian speaking English'. He concluded that Lawrence was hostile to Jewish settlers in Palestine.29 While in Cairo, Aaronsohn was able to maintain links with his Zichron Ya'akov colleagues who fed him information on Turkish military activities. His value to the British was such that Whitehall agreed to a recommenda tion by the English Zionist Federation that, in addition to his intelligence responsibilities, he should work with two local Jews as an executive officer of a special committee to 'assess the interests of the Allies in Palestine and further the cause of Zionism'. He also co-authored a military guide entitled Palestine Handbook, as well as writing some reports that appeared in the highly confidential Arab Bulletin, an organ of the Arab Bureau in Cairo.30 But he became so frustrated by the lack of British military action in the region that he developed a plan for capturing Jerusalem, telling the British that, since the eastern route to the city was beyond their control and that an L. Stein, The Balfour Declaration (London 1961) 294. R. Meinertzhagen, Middle East Diary, 79/7-/956 (London 1959) 211. Ibid. 5. M. Gilbert, Exile and Return (Philadelphia and New York 1978) 108. I. Friedman (see n. 10) 381. A. Engle (see n. 13) 230. A. Verrier (see n. 1) 289. I. Friedman (see n. to) 204. 183</page><page sequence="8">Cecil Bloom attack from the south and west was not advantageous, the city could be captured by a sudden attack from the valley of Esdraelon in the north. He pointed out that the northern route had almost always been the route of success in the past. 'Palestine is a ripe fruit', he said, 'a good shake-up and it will fall into your hands.'31 But the British were cautious after the Gallipoli fiasco and nothing came of his proposal. At one point Allenby estimated that about half a million troops would be required to capture Jerusalem, but Aaronsohn questioned this because he believed that Turkish morale had plunged to the depths. He persisted, nevertheless, and proposed capturing Beersheba by surprise by outflanking Gaza: this was successfully achieved in October 1917, two months before Jerusalem fell. There is no doubt that Aaronsohn was responsible for getting the British to understand how disordered and chaotic Turkish Palestine had become. His exceptional knowledge of the country became a crucial factor in form ing the tactics used by Allenby in his campaign. Through his intimate knowledge of the land, Aaronsohn was able to show British troops where water could be found underground, whereas water had previously to be carried from Egypt by rail. Yet he could not do this until he bullied the offi cer commanding the Royal Engineers to send back to Egypt for boring machinery. He guaranteed they would find water at a depth of 300 feet, and water was indeed found there.32 After his death, Allenby paid tribute to him. 'The death of Aaron Aaronsohn', he wrote, 'deprived me of a valued friend and of a staff officer impossible to replace. He was mainly responsible for the formation of my Field Intelligence organisation behind Turkish lines . . . His death is a loss to the British Empire and to Zionism but the work he has done can never die.'33 One senior soldier, Brigadier Walter Gribbon, who worked closely with him, said that Aaron was responsible for saving 30,000 British lives: 'The Jews must remember that no man has done more than Aaron to make the conquest of Palestine by the British possible.'34 To Ormsby-Gore the Aaronsohns 'were . . . the most valuable nucleus of our intelligence service in Palestine during the War.... Nothing we can do for [them]... will repay the work they have done and what they have suffered for us.'35 It is clear from his diaries that Aaronsohn had much influence and input into the strategy for dealing with the war with Turkey36 and interacted with Cairo 31 Ibid. 204-5. 32 Sir Basil Thomson, The Scene Changes (London 1939) 355. 33 L. Stein (see n. 23) 294. Allenby's handwritten letter is housed in the Aaronsohn Archives at Zichron Ya'akov. 34 A. Engle (see n. 13) 222. 35 PRO, FO371/4167/801. 36 Aaronsohn's diary entries from 12 December 1916 to 18 February 1919 are included in A. 184</page><page sequence="9">Aaron Aaronsohn: forgotten man of history? staff at all levels from General Clayton, Director of Intelligence and later Chief Political Officer, downwards. He was regarded by British establish ment figures in this way because he was cast in a different mould from the Jews the British knew and worked with in Europe. Although born in Eastern Europe, he personified the new generation of Jewish pioneers in Palestine, which struck an approving and admiring chord among them. Over the eight months from February to October 1917, NILI regularly gave information to British intelligence via a network extending from Beersheba to Damascus. Once a month, when there was no moon, a naval sloop from Port Said would land near Athlit and Sarah Aaronsohn would pass over intelligence reports.37 Carrier pigeons were occasionally used. In Cairo, Aaron, in close contact with key members of intelligence staff, was NILI's supreme head, but operations were jointly led by his sister Sarah and by Yosef Lishansky, a former member of the Ha-Shomer, the 'watch man' organization founded by pioneers of the Second Aliyah. It has been claimed that Lishansky rather than Bedouin murdered Feinberg, because they were rivals for the leadership of NILI and for the hand of Sarah,38 but there is little evidence for this. Sarah had been briefly and unhappily married to a Bulgarian Jew with whom she lived in Constantinople, return ing to Zichron Ya'akov in 1915. Twenty-three active members collected and transmitted intelligence data to the British, besides some twelve passive ones.39 In all more than a hundred worked on NILI's behalf, some serving in the Turkish army and some engaged on road construction and on water supplies. The NILI network handed over to Allenby's HQ_data that included topographic and visual intelligence about ground and aerial activity, as well as information on the deployment and battle orders of enemy forces. Of even greater value were reports on joint Turkish and German intentions, their expected reserves and their strengths. Even ciphers relating to links between Damascus, Turkey and Germany were obtained.40 Some information was extracted from German pilots who were treated medically by a physician who was a NILI spy.41 On one occasion, NILI notified Cairo that four new Verrier (see n. i) 224-302. There are also two Appendices written respectively by Alexander and Aaron Aaronsohn. E. Samuel, yd Lifetime in Jerusalem (London 1970) 33. Papers lodged in the Bodleian Library in Oxford. Shelfmark MS Eng C6752 pp. 81-2. The source of these papers is unknown. My thanks to the Bodleian Library for permission to quote from papers deposited there. A. Verrier (see n. 1) 310-11. Y. Sheffy, 'Institutionalized Deception and Perception Reinforcement: Allenby's Campaign in Palestine' Intelligence and National Security V no. 2 (April 1990) 180-1. Y. Sheffy, 'Intelligence in the Middle East 1900-1918: How much do we know?' Intelligence and National Security XVII no. 1 (Spring 2002) 47. ï85</page><page sequence="10">Cecil Bloom German fighter planes were arriving in the area, which allowed the British to bring in more of their own planes to restore air superiority.42 Sarah and Lishansky together carried out daring exploits, touring as far as Damascus to search out secret sympathizers and recording everything of possible value to the British. They even made contact with senior German staff offi cers in Jerusalem, from whom they learnt German troop numbers (50,000) and their locations. They also obtained a map of Jerusalem's fortifica tions.43 In April 1917 Sarah left Palestine to see her brother in Egypt, and both he and the British pleaded with her not to return home, but she did return and took part in a number of further operations. By that time the Yishuv leadership had stopped opposing NILI's activities. Then tragedy struck. The Turks found a carrier pigeon which had landed among those of a Turkish officer at Caesarea, and the message in a metal cylinder confirmed their suspicions that there was an espionage network. It is difficult to understand why carrier pigeons that could easily be identified were used. But as a consequence, Na'aman Belkind, a member of NILI, was captured and provided the Turks with information that led to the settlement at Zichron Ya'akov being surrounded in October 1917. Many NILI members including Sarah were arrested. Lishansky escaped and found temporary refuge with some old Ha-Shomer colleagues, but the Turks made it clear that, unless he was handed over to them, the whole Zichron Ya'akov settlement would be destroyed. Ha-Shomer decided to assassinate him, but he escaped, only to be caught by Bedouin near Rishon le-Zion and handed over to the Turks. He and Belkind were put to death. The Turks tried to get Sarah to disclose the names of her associates. Her father was beaten unconscious and she herself was tortured for four days before she took her own life by shooting herself in the mouth with a pistol she had previously hidden. She had a lingering death and left a letter which said 'tell them about our martyrdom ... we have died as warriors ... we have striven, we have paved a road of right and happiness for the Nation'.44 In Egypt, Aaron heard of the details of his family's fate from a former pris oner-of-war. 'What he tells us about the heroism of Sarah and our father', he wrote, 'is on such an exalted plane, it is great, almost impossible to under stand. .. . However much they suffered, one is filled with pride to know that if they were sacrifices they were great sacrifices.'45 Elie Eliachar, who became an important businessman and politician in Israel after 1948, and who was forced as a young man to act as translator and interpreter for the Turks, 42 Y. Sheffy, British Military Intelligence in the Palestine Campaign, igi4~içi8 (London and Portland, Or. 1998) 165. 43 A. Engle (see n. 13) 103-7. 44 A. Verrier (see n. 1) 13. 45 A. Engle (see n. 13) 224. 186</page><page sequence="11">Aaron Aaronsohn: forgotten man of history? described how he suffered just watching what happened to some of the NILI spies after torture. The Turkish commander was the chief medical officer of the Turkish Fourth Army, a Syrian called Hassan Bek, who had a fanatical hatred of Jews. Eliachar described the torture that was mainly of the falacca, that is flogging the soles of the feet with bull's sinews, but he later saw one man whom he was forced to question as being emaciated beyond recogni tion.46 Sir George Aston, who was directly involved in military intelligence in the war, briefly referred to Sarah in his book on the Secret Service, writing that he mentioned her 'to give an example of extreme heroism in a girl in enduring pain', adding that those acquainted with Turkish methods would fully comprehend.47 Most of the spies were rounded up and subjected to prolonged torture, and this was the end of NILI. There has been some speculation as to whether the S. A. to whom T. E. Lawrence dedicated his Seven Pillars of Wisdom might have been Sarah. Lawrence added a love poem to the dedication and the identity of the dedi catee has fascinated many. Some commentators have argued that S.A. refers to a place not a person. An Arab donkey boy called Salim Ahmed is the most popular candidate, although Lawrence may have intended his S. A. to stand for a number of different people and places. There is no evidence that Sarah ever met Lawrence, but a writer called Douglas Duff who had been an offi cer in the Palestine Police in the 1920s and who was a deep admirer of the Aaronsohns and their work has claimed that a few weeks before his death in 1935 Lawrence told him that Sarah was, indeed, his dedicatee.* One of Allenby's senior staff commented that it was largely due to the work of NILI that Allenby accomplished his undertaking. Major-General Sir George MacDonogh, director of military intelligence at the War Office, who was in favour of Aaronsohn's plans and became a staunch supporter of Zionism, said that 'all the cards of [Allenby's] enemy were revealed to him so he could play his hand with complete confidence.'48 The top intelligence chief in the area, Wyndham Deedes, recognized NILI as an important intelligence resource.49 NILI was the most famous spy network operating in the Middle East during the 1914-18 war, but it usually took a relatively long time for the data it collected to reach Cairo. Other systems using wireless and aerial reconnaissance, as well as interrogation of prisoners and deserters, are now considered by some scholars to have been just as important.50 Aaronsohn E. Eliachar, Living unth Jews (London 1983) 65-6. Sir George Aston, Secret Service (London 1930) 184. C. Bloom, 'Immortal Beloved' Jerusalem Post, 15 May 2005. A. Verrier (see n. 1) 206-7. War Office Records (hereafter WO) WO157/718. Intelligence summaries. Y. Sheffy (see n. 41) 48. 187</page><page sequence="12">Cecil Bloom himself recognized the need for rapid communication. He suggested a tele phone cable line from Athlit, but nothing came of his proposal.51 NILI may have been destroyed but Aaron Aaronsohn was still active and took his part in world Zionist politics. In Cairo he organized the Special Committee for the Relief of Jews in Palestine, to enable the transfer of funds from Europe and the United States to the Yishuv,52 but his work as executive officer of the committee was not easy. Weizmann wrote to an offi cial at the Foreign Office that Aaronsohn had written him two 'crazy' letters which were 'violent, not to say hysterical'.53 Apparently, Aaronsohn was bitterly opposed to a proposal to amalgamate his committee with another, the Alexandria-Palestine Committee that had been set up in Alexandria by refugees from Palestine. Weizmann was unhappy at leaving control of the distribution of money for relief purposes solely with Aaronsohn and his associates.54 Aaron was then sent to London by Sir Reginald Wingate, High Commissioner in Egypt, to carry out special political work in the light of the British government's expected support for a Jewish national home.55 However, he was seen as an awkward man and Weizmann's letters show that the two did not always see eye to eye. But Aaronsohn was valued by some Zionists in Europe and was present at a meeting between Weizmann and other Zionists with Arthur Balfour prior to Balfour's declaration on Zionism's future.56 His voice was said to have been a 'persuasive' one when the draft of the declaration was being prepared.57 With Weizmann and Nahum Sokolow, he was also at a meeting at the Foreign Office a few days before the Balfour Declaration was issued, called to discuss how maximum advantage at home and abroad could be gained from the declaration's publi cation. It was decided that these three would use their influence in various countries - Aaronsohn would work in the United States.58 He twice went to the United States on behalf of the Zionist movement, first in November 1917, when Weizmann and Sokolow hoped that he could persuade the Americans to provide full support for the Allied cause in the Middle East and ensure British and American Zionists co-operated together fully.59 But he was instructed not to make public speeches or give Ibid. 169. L. Stein (ed.) The Papers and Letters ofChaim Weizmann VII (Jerusalem 1975) 545. Ibid. 508. J. Reinharz, Chaim Weizmann (New York and London 1993) 193. M. Passow, Quartet (WZO Education Dept. n.d.) 77. I. Friedman (see n. 10) 280. M. Gilbert, Israel: A History (London, New York, Toronto, Sydney and Auckland 1998) 34. PRO, FO/371/3083. D. Barzilay and B. Litvinoff (eds) The Papers and Letters of Cham Weizmann VIII (Jerusalem 1977) 6-7. 188</page><page sequence="13">Aaron Aaronsohn: forgotten man of history? press interviews, which suggests that the leaders in London had some concern about his capriciousness. Weizmann, in fact, showed ambivalence towards Aaronsohn, but nevertheless said he was heartbroken at his 'terri ble' death which was a loss to all60 and wrote to Aaronsohn's siblings that their brother had been a 'great man, a heroic figure in Jewish life and his place will never be filled', adding that 'a great Jew is no more'.61 It is curi ous, though, that Aaronsohn was given the important task of making contact with the Americans, because his philosophy on Zionism differed markedly from that of Weizmann and most other leading figures. This suggests that Mark Sykes might have been instrumental in his choosing. Aaronsohn was associated with a movement in the Yishuv generally in conflict ideologically with the majority, and viewed Jews in the West as 'anti-Zionists' because they believed Zionism would succeed only if supported by governments that adopted pro-Zionist policies. He dismissed partition of the country, insisting that the boundaries of a meaningful Zionist state should be pushed as far north and northeast as possible. As a result, he became increasingly isolated from other leading Zionists, but claimed that his views were supported by a number of British non-Jews whom he believed were closer to him in spirit and understanding than the leading European Jews. At one stage, towards the end of the war, Aaronsohn apparently decided that he no longer wanted to work with the mainstream Zionists, and Weizmann claimed he did not understand why.62 This does not seem credible in view of Aaronsohn's clear opinions, but Weizmann believed Aaronsohn to be a man who could not stand anyone and that nobody could stand him. It seems that Aaronsohn returned to the fold within a few weeks. Weizmann said that in spite of all the man's short comings he was 'a wonderful worker',63 and once wrote to his wife Vera that Aaronsohn's behaviour was perfect and that they worked together as good comrades.64 But on another occasion he told her that he thought the situa tion was getting to the point where he would have to stop working with Aaronsohn, accusing him of blackmail, although he gave no reasons for this.65 In September 1918 Aaronsohn was sent again to the United States with a clear brief. His primary objectives were defined as trying to raise funds for long-term loans to Yishuv farmers, to encourage American participation in the Zionist Commission, to obtain American help for a drainage plan in 60 J. Reinharz (ed.) The Papers and Letters of Cham Weizmann IX (Jerusalem 1977) 142, 145. 61 Ibid. 147-8. 62 D. Barzilay and B. Litvinoff (see n. 59) 217. 63 Ibid. 225. 64 Ibid. 228. 65 Ibid. 171-2. 189</page><page sequence="14">Cecil Bloom Jerusalem and to discuss future plans for the social, economic and political rehabilitation of Palestine.66 The British ambassador in Washington was asked to give him all the assistance he could in his liaison work with American organizations, so this assignment was clearly seen as important by the British. Weizmann wrote to Judge Brandeis in the United States that Aaronsohn was 'most loyal, friendly and efficient' and that he went to America with his fullest confidence.67 Weizmann clearly waxed and waned in his opinion of Aaronsohn. At the end of the war he told him that he was quite happy with his reports, and a few weeks later when Aaronsohn was in Paris he demonstrated his confi dence in him by telling him that he trusted him fully and that 'you may have to act without having time to ask for instructions'.68 The British Government now saw Aaronsohn as a key man in carrying out propaganda on its behalf, and when it sent Weizmann to Palestine as head of the Zionist Commission, Aaronsohn went as a member of the delegation. Whitehall was concerned that Russia might be unhappy at an invasion of Palestine that would lead to British colonization, and that this would compromise Russia's commitment to the war against Germany. Aaronsohn succeeded in getting Labour socialist refugees from Russia in Egypt to support the Allies in liberating the country from the Turks, who in turn appealed to fellow organizations in America and in Russia to support the Allied cause and free the Jewish proletariat in Palestine from Turkish suppression.69 Aaronsohn's Zionist work continued when the war ended, for he was present at the Paris Peace Conference and appeared before the Council of Four at Versailles where he took part in the talks on the future of Palestine and its boundaries. He asked William Bullitt, who was President Wilson's Special Counsellor in Paris, if the four statesmen would understand his request that a particular field should be incorporated into the Jewish State that he hoped would be set up. His reason was that it contained a unique specimen of a wild plant that should be preserved and that Jews would tend it, while he feared that Arabs would neglect it.70 Aaronsohn was an agrono mist right to the end. Anxious to return home as soon as possible, he flew by a special RAF mail plane from London to Paris in May 1919. It capsized in Boulogne harbour, and his body was never found. Rumours of sabotage are almost certainly unfounded. His friend and admirer Meinertzhagen was satisfied that there was no foul play and Rivka Aaronsohn, who was still living in 66 Ibid. 227. 67 Ibid. 233. 68 J. Reinharz (see n. 60) 63. 69 I. Friedman (see n. 10) 187. 70 H. V. F. Winstone (see n. 11) 355. 190</page><page sequence="15">Aaron Aaronsohn: forgotten man of history? 1980 at Zichron Ya'akov, was also satisfied that his death was accidental.71 According to the The Times he was mourned as a 'strong broad-shouldered man of the best type of open-air Jew'.72 After his death Weizmann described him as a 'great man, a heroic figure in Jewish life' whose place 'would never be filled',73 although during his lifetime Weizmann had not been so full of praise. Felix Frankfurter, who led the American Zionist delegation at the 1919 Peace Conference, said 'You cannot speak too gener ously of his genius, of his originality, of his resourcefulness, the power of his personality to set aflame the mind and spirit of others. [He was] one of the few men whom I have ever known who really had heroic stature.'74 He also said 'I do not need all the fingers of my two hands to include him [Aaronsohn] among the most memorable persons I have encountered in life.'75 William Bullitt wrote to Alexander Aaronsohn shortly after his brother's death as follows: He was, I believe, the greatest man I have ever known. He seemed a sort of giant of an elder day . . . like Prometheus. It is not easy to express his great ness in lifeless words; for he was the quintessence of life; of life when it runs torrential, prodigal and joyous. Many men, no doubt, are as great as he was intellectually, they are not great also emotionally, as he was: great in courage, in sympathy, in desire, in tenderness, in swift human understanding, great at once in dealings with statesmen and children. ... I remember him in Washington - how diplomats sat open mouthed, astonished by his knowledge and insight, and were warmed by his picture of the Zion to be. I remember him in Paris . . . how from the first he foresaw the end of the tragic drama, how unerringly he picked his way through a thousand diplomatic pitfalls, how wise he was in counsel and how strong in friendship.... The Jewish race had many brilliant leaders but when Aaron died I believe it lost the man who, before all others, could kindle the hearts and minds of men of other nations to active sympathy. And not Zion alone will suffer for his loss.76 Bullitt, who later served as US ambassador in Moscow and in Paris, never forgot Aaronsohn. Some twenty-five years after his death, in an address to commemorate the twentieth anniversary of the American-British Convention on Palestine, he lauded Aaronsohn as a great man who, had he lived, would have become a world leader. He claimed to share many of 71 Ibid. 357. 72 The Times 20 May 1919, p. 11. 73 J. Reinharz (see n. 60) 147. 74 A. Verrier (see n. 1) 16. 75 H. V. F. Winstone (see n. 11) 444. 76 Ibid. 360. Letter to Alexander Aaronsohn dated 9 April 1920. i9i</page><page sequence="16">Cecil Bloom Aaronsohn's opinions on the question of Palestine, and gave an impression of Aaronsohn's views that differs somewhat from those generally under stood. He said that Aaronsohn had neither hatred nor contempt for the Arabs in Palestine, although believing profoundly that the fate of world Jewry demanded that Palestine should be a free and independent state. But he was not in favour of Jewish immigration into a mandated country against the wishes of an Arab majority. Under such circumstances, Aaronsohn thought it would be better for Jews to remain under Turkish rule 'rather than become a hated minority surrounded by masses of Mohammedans'. Aaronsohn, Bullitt claimed, was anxious to persuade Palestinians Arabs to emigrate to Iraq, which 'could be turned once more by irrigation into the garden of the world' by the waters of the Tigris and the Euphrates. He added that Aaronsohn recognized that Jerusalem was a holy place for Arabs and Christians as well as Jews, and that both Jerusalem and Bethlehem should be administered jointly by representatives of the three faiths.77 Bullitt also said that he had 'many times' sat with Aaronsohn and Weizmann 'while they thought out together policies and plans'. There has, of course, been no suggestion from Weizmann that he communicated with Aaronsohn in this manner, and this in itself must raise questions regarding the credibility of what Bullitt claimed were Aaronsohn's views. Sir Charles Kingsley Webster also spoke in glowing terms about Aaronsohn. As a member of the intelligence directorate at the War Office in 1917, he was involved in the appraisal of Zionism and was later a member of the British delegation at the Paris Peace Conference. In a Chaim Weizmann Memorial Lecture he singled out Aaronsohn as one who had made a deep impression on him and who was also admired by many British government officials. Aaronsohn was Webster's first Yishuv contact, and his 'unexampled knowledge of Palestine and his complete faith that the land could be made to blossom like a rose by Jewish skill and industry' was important because it contradicted those who believed that only a fraction of Jews could successfully settle in the country. He believed his premature death was a great loss to the Zionist cause - and to Weizmann.78 The Aaronsohn family, especially Aaron, made substantial contributions to the events leading up to the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, but it is puzzling that Aaron Aaronsohn's contribution and that of his siblings and of the NILI organization have not received due recognition. W. C. Bullitt, Address given on 23 April 1944 to commemorate the 20th anniversary of the American-British Convention on Palestine, Central Zionist Archives (Jerusalem) Document BK 26.335.1am grateful to Rivka Bar-Tikva, Central Zionist Archives, for this information. Sir Charles K. Webster, 'The Founder of the National Home', Chaim Weizmann Memorial Lecture, 27 November 1955; Central Zionist Archives (Jerusalem) Document BK 15.984, pp. 21-2. My thanks once more to Rivka Bar-Tikva for pointing this out to me. 192</page><page sequence="17">Aaron Aaronsohn: forgotten man of history? The Aaronsohn home has been preserved as a national memorial and houses a museum with archives. Furthermore, Israeli postage stamps have been issued featuring the heads of both Sarah and Aaron; and the anniver sary of Sarah's death is commemorated each year with a pilgrimage to Zichron Ya'akov. Several standard works on the history of the period refer to Aaronsohn and his associates, but many important works do not and it is difficult to understand why this is so. The British publisher Frank Cass in the late 1990s issued within a year of each other two books on British mili tary intelligence in the Middle East during the First World War. The first, published in 1998 and entitled British Military Intelligence in the Palestine Campaign 1914-18, written by an Israeli, Yigal Sheffy, refers to the Aaronsohns and to NILI in some detail. But the other, Allenby and British Strategy in the Middle East igiy-19 by Matthew Hughes, makes no refer ence to them whatsoever. Weizmann referred very briefly to Aaron Aaronsohn in his auto biography Trial and Error,79 as did Sokolow in his History of Zionism Israel Cohen's A Short History of Zionism mentioned only Sarah Aaronsohn's death,81 while the official history of military operations in Egypt and Palestine ignores the NILI ring. Leonard Stein is one of the few Zionist historians to have given some prominence to Aaronsohn's role, stat ing in The Balfour Declaration that Aaronsohn did more than has generally been recognized by Zionist historians to help create a favourable atmos phere prior to Balfour's Declaration,82 and paying credit to his work in Cairo. A later biography of Weizmann contains many references to Aaronsohn, acknowledging that he was a significant participant in Zionist politics in 1917 and 1918.83 Weizmann's letters after Aaronsohn's death make it clear that he had little time for Aaron's surviving siblings. In letters to his wife he refers to 'that gang',84 'such scum'85 and 'those outrageous people'.86 On one occa sion he told her the Aaronsohns were 'poisoning the minds of great people',87 and later that Alexander Aaronsohn was a 'real Rasputin'.88 Despite positive words to Aaronsohn and comments immediately after his death, Weizmann seems to have been content to ignore Aaronsohn's C. Weizmann, Trial and Error (London 1949) 229, 232, 321. N. Sokolow, The History of Zionism II (London 1919) 139. I. Cohen, A Short History ofZiomsm (London 1951)69. L. Stein (see n. 23) 293-5. J. Reinharz, Chaim Weizmann (New York and London 1993). B. Wasserstein (ed.) The Letters and Papers of Chatm Weizmann XI (Jerusalem 1977) 272. Ibid. 299. Ibid. 305. J. Freundlich (ed.) The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann XII (Jerusalem 1977) 72. Ibid. 79. 193</page><page sequence="18">Cecil Bloom achievements. When Weizmann was asked by an association of veteran settlers in Palestine to support plans to honour Aaron Aaronsohn's memory in 1944, he wrote to the Jewish Agency that he knew personally of Aaronsohn's services during the war and 'I feel we owe something to his memory'. He suggested that the Agency issue 'an appropriate statement' with which he would associate himself.89 There is no record of any response from the Agency, which leaves the impression that there was no sincere wish on Weizmann's part to mark Aaronsohn's contribution. The association of the Aaronsohns with a group viewed by the majority as being beyond the pale led other writers also to disregard Aaronsohn's role. Aaron was no socialist and his brother openly opposed the Workers' Movement in the Yishuv,90 whereas most of the leading figures there were Labour Zionists. The NILI organization gathered little support when it was first set up, and the mainstream in the Yishuv, which remained contemptuous even much later, was suspicious of NILI's motives. It has been argued that spying was then viewed as a violation of an accepted code of honour. A spy was regarded as 'the scum of humanity' and one 'devoid of conscience'.91 Even when the Zionist Commission went to Palestine, some public figures refused to sit at the same table as Aaronsohn, whom they saw as 'the man who endangered the Yishuv.92 The ring was by then perceived postwar as having recklessly endangered the whole community, if only because its network extended right across Palestine and involved a number of couriers.93 This could explain Ben-Gurion's expression of contempt even fifty years after the events. Some showed bitter hatred towards Aaronsohn and NILI. Annie Landau, who had been in charge of the British Evalina Rothschild school in Palestine (and was a militant anti-Zionist), referred to Aaronsohn as 'an ignorant uncultured upstart, a selfish and unscrupulous opportunist' who worked under the cloak of Zionism 'to feather his own nest'. She even accused him of having stolen his wild-wheat discovery from an Alsatian Christian woman.94 He certainly tended to irritate Jewish colleagues, and was clearly difficult to work with. But there is no justification for Landau's accusations. Even in 1938, when Aaronsohn had long been dead, more seri ous accusations were levelled anonymously at all the Aaronsohns. A close associate of Alexander, the writer Douglas Duff, received a letter almost certainly from someone in Palestine. The writer attacked Sarah for her 89 M.J. Cohen(ed.) The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann XXI (Jerusalem 1979) 181-2. 90 A. Engle (see n. 13) 37 91 A. Shapira, Land and Power (Stanford, Cal. 1999) 89. 92 A. Engle (see n. 13) 225. 93 Y. Sheffy (see n. 42) 159-61. 94 F. E. Manuel, The Realities of American-Palestine Relations (Westport, Conn. 1975) 180. 194</page><page sequence="19">Aaron Aaronsohn: forgotten man of history? sexual immorality and her sister Rivka for supplying twelve-year-old girls to senior British officials in the country. Alexander was said to have been a counter-intelligence agent for the Turks who betrayed Sarah to the Turks, as well as seducing a rich old lady in order to inherit her estate. He was also accused of receiving bribes from the Mufti of Jerusalem. Aaron and both his parents were also slandered.95 Alexander was apparently unsuccessful in his efforts to identify the writer of the letter. Why such a letter should have been written some twenty years after the events is unclear. For a man with such a dominant personality, it is strange that Aaron Aaronsohn appears to have had no personal political ambitions. Perhaps jealousy played a part in the way he was ignored by many of the leading European Zionist figures of his day and subsequently by historians. The resentment of Jewish contemporaries and his high profile in British govern ment circles may have been a factor. He was the only Palestinian Jew in whom the British in the Middle East showed any confidence and was admired by a wide circle of non-Jews in London. His high reputation in the United States may also have contributed to the antagonism. Bullitt's remarks about diplomats being 'open-mouthed in wonder' may not have endeared him to some mainstream Zionists in Europe. Weizmann's comments on Aaronsohn and his siblings suggest that he had little time for them. One of Weizmann's biographers, referring to the occa sion when Sykes suggested that Aaronsohn take Weizmann's place at a meeting in Cairo if he himself could not go, remarked 'As well despatch a time bomb'.96 This points to severe animosity on Weizmann's part. Aaronsohn's activities in London, Cairo, Paris and America were ignored by Weizmann in his autobiography, which is surprising given Aaronsohn's work for Zionism. One commentator has argued that disputes in the Yishuv and in Zionist circles troubled people's consciences, and led to a desire, conscious or not, to delete NILI and the Aaronsohns from their view of history.97 Engle has referred to the 'mysterious cherem ['ban'] which seems to have been put on the name of Aaronsohn',98 as though some did want to blank out his contribution to Zionist history. Vladimir Jabotinsky has tanta lizingly added to the puzzle. He did name Sarah Aronson (sic), and described some of the tortures to which she was subjected by the Turks.99 But he 95 Letter to Douglas Duff of 5 September 1938. My thanks to Esther Dekel, Beit Aharonsohn, Zichron Ya'akov, for a copy of this letter. 96 B. Litvinoff, Weizmanrt: Last of the Patriarchs (London, Sydney, Auckland and Toronto 1976) 105. 97 A. Engle (see n. 13) ix. 98 A. Engle, 'Prophet of the Negey' Jewish Affairs (July 1957). My thanks to Susan Woodland, Hadassah Archivist, New York. 99 V. Jabotinsky, The Story of the Jewish Legion (New York n.d.) 119-20. My thanks to Amira Stern, Jabotinsky Institute, Tel Aviv. 195</page><page sequence="20">Cecil Bloom referred to Aaron Aaronsohn and NILI only once, without mentioning their names. In his book entitled The Story of the Jewish Legion he writes of a 'strong, talented man, great in his virtues and great in his failings' who 'built up, under the noses [of the Turks and the Germans] a secret organisation for supplying the British with information'. He added, however, that 'the better part of the Yishuv for many years could not speak of it [NILI] except with hatred and abhorrence. I cannot judge who are in the right.' Jabotinsky described the NILI operatives as 'figures of epic determination' who were prepared to make 'the supreme sacrifice'. He hoped that a minstrel would arise to 'sing of those days, of those people, with their misdeeds and their noble heroism, with their irresponsibility, and their undaunted bravery.' Jabotinsky unfortunately did not explain what he meant by the 'irresponsi bility' and the 'misdeeds' of the Aaronsohns, but expressed admiration even though he was unable to 'judge' whether NILI or the Yishuv leadership was 'in the right'. It should be noted that the meeting commemorating the American-British Convention on Palestine at which Bullitt spoke was under the auspices of the Revisionists' New Zionist Organization. Aaron Aaronsohn was clearly a man of unusual qualities, described on his death as a 'very practical dreamer of dreams' and one who had been a 'very pillar of support' for the Jewish cause.100 To Judge Brandeis, he was 'one of the most interesting, brilliant and remarkable men' he had ever met.101 He was said to be a picturesque figure102 and was clearly a man with charisma, highly respected by key British government figures. He was also a difficult man, which led him to make enemies in Zionist circles. His premature death at the age of forty-three partly explains the lack of recognition, and begs the question of what influence he would have had on subsequent Jewish and Zionist history had he not perished so young. Acknowledgements I would like to thank Rivka Bar-Tikva of the Central Zionist archives in Jerusalem for providing me with the Bullitt and Webster papers; Susan Woodland, Hadassah Archivist in New York, for the article by Anita Engle in Jewish Affairs and Esther Dekel of Beit Aharonsohn in Zichron Ya'akov for the copy of the 1938 letter pillorying the Aaronsohn family. I would also like to thank Anita Stern of the Jabotinsky Institute in Tel Aviv for provid ing me with the Jabotinsky information and Colin Harris of the Bodleian Library, Oxford, for permission to quote from the papers deposited there. 100 Jewish Chronicle 23 May 1919, p. 6. 101 J. L. Brandeis, Brandeis on Zionism (Washington, DC 1942) 39. 102 Jewish Chronicle 30 May 1919, p. 10. 196</page></plain_text>